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NEW YORK CONFERENCE OF BLUE CROSS
& BLUE SHIELD PLANS V TRAVELERS
INSURANCE CO.: VICARIOUS LIABILITY
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AGAINST
MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS
ESCAPING ERISA'S GRASP
[P]atients enjoy the right to be free from medical malprac-
. tice regardless of whether or not their medical care is
provided through an ERISA plan)
In February of 1992, Katie Haas visited her HMO and complained
of a "closed feeling" in her ears. Ms. Haas had health coverage
through Group Health Plans, Inc. ("GHP"), which she had obtained
as part of a benefits package from her employer. 3 Roger Young, a nurse
practitioner for GHP, concluded that Ms. Haas's ears suffered from
wax build-up and decided to clean her ears by injecting a solution from
a syringe into her ear canals. 4 As a GHP technician injected the solu-
tion into Ms. Haas's left ear, Ms. Haas heard a loud popping sound
and felt a sharp jolt of pain. 5 Several days later, Ms. Haas visited a
physician, complaining of persistent pain in her left ear." The physician
informed her that her eardrum was punctured and that she would
suffer from permanent disability as a result.?
Ms. Haas brought suit in Illinois state court seeking recovery from
GHP for the negligence of its health care providers. 8 She brought her
claim under a theory of vicarious liability, a state common law doctrine
by which an employer or principal may be liable for the negligent acts
of his or her employee or agent.'' Because Ms. Haas's health coverage
was part of an employee benefit plan, GHP claimed that the Employee
Retirement. Income Security Act ("ERISA"), a federal statute governing
I Dukes v. United Slates Healthcare, inc., 57 F.3d 350, 358 (3e1 Cir. 1095).
2 Haas v. Group Heald) Plan, Inc., 875 F. Stipp, 544, 544; (S.D. Ill. 1904).
3 Id.
4 Id.
Id.
Id.
7 hews, 875 F. Stipp. at 546.
8 Id.
9 Id.
813
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employee benefit plans, preempted her state law claim.'" GHP sub-
sequently removed the claim to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois for resolution of the preemption issue."
Although ERISA contains a civil remedy provision allowing plaintiffs
to bring a variety of claims against employee benefit plans, Ms. Haas's
common law malpractice claim was not among the claims allowed by
the statute.' 2 Fortunately for Ms. Haas, the court rejected GHP's argu-
ment and held that ERISA does not preempt vicarious liability mal-
practice claims brought against managed care organizations.I 3 The
court allowed Ms. Haas to proceed in her common law suit and to
pursue a full and complete recovery from GHP."
Catherine Ricci, by contrast, was not as fortunate.'' In 1990, Ms.
Ricci visited South Jersey Radiology for a mammogram.' 6 The radiolo-
gist who performed the mammogram, Dr. Hikan Chon, checked the
incorrect box on the test result sheet so as to indicate that the mam-
mogram showed normal results.'' Her mammogram, however, actually
showed a small mass of tissue in her left breast.' 8 Had Ms. Ricci had an
immediate follow-up visit, she could have had a lumpectomy per-
formed to remove the tissue build-up.'" Instead, nearly one year later,
Ms. Ricci developed breast cancer and was forced to undergo a inas-
tectomy. 2°
Ms. Ricci subsequently brought. a malpractice suit directly against
Dr. Chon, Dr. Gooberman, who reviewed but failed to detect the
incorrectly completed report, and South Jersey Radiology. 21 She also
brought a vicarious liability claim against the managed care organiza-
tion, U.S. Healthcare. 22 As with Ms. Haas, Ms. Ricci's health coverage
was part of an employee benefit plan provided by her employer. 23 And
19 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)). The provision of ERISA preempting state laws
is found at 29 U.S.C. § 1144. See infra notes 108-33 and accompanying text for an overview of
ERISA.
11 Id.
1`2
	 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
" Haas, 875 F. Stipp. at 549.
14 See id. at 546.
15 See Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 E Supp. 316, 318 (an 1093).
16 Barham Gonhelf, $1M Medical Malpractice Verdict, N.J. lsw., Jan. 23, 1995, at 7.
17 11(11.
19 Dana Coleman, HMOs Are Protected Prom Vicarious Liability Claims,N.J.LAw., Jan. 24, 1094,
at 5.
20 Id.
21 Ricci, MO E Stipp. at 316.
22 hi.
V Id.
July 1996]	 ERISA AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY 	 815
as did the managed care organization in Haas, U.S. Healthcare re-
moved the case to federal court, claiming that ERISA preempted the
vicarious liability claim.24 Unlike the district court in Haas, however,
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that
ERISA did indeed preempt her vicarious liability claim. 25 Ms. Ricci
therefore was unable to proceed in her claim against U.S. Healthcare
for the negligence of its physicians. 26 Consequently, her only avenue of
recovery was the direct negligence action against the radiology facility
and the physicians personally. 27 This result limited Ms. Ricci's recovery
to the negligent physicians' personal assets and insurance coverage—
sources inadequate to sufficiently compensate her for the permanently
disabling injury they inflicted. 25
To date, United States district courts have been unable to agree
on whether ERISA preempts vicarious liability claims brought against
managed care organizations. 2° Disagreement on this issue has led to
inconsistent results among different districts as well as contradictory
2.1 Id.
25 Id. at 318.
26 See Ricci, 840 F. Stipp. at 318.
27 See id.
25 Although Ms. Ricci was unable to recover from U.S. Healthcare, she was ultimately able to
recover frtmi her physician and the facility at which the original mammogram was performed.
Cotthelf, ,supra note 16, at 7. She was able to recover because both the negligent physician and
the facility carried adequate malpractice insurance. See id. Surprisingly, however, medical mal-
practice insurance is not mandatory in ninny states. For example, one 1990 study estimated that
a full 40% of all physicians in one 540n.hern Florida county did not carry any malpractice coverage
at all. Rick Eyerdamn, More Physicians Lack Malpractice Coverage, S. FLA. Bus. J., Aug. 27, 1990, at
5. Some physicians find the cost of malpractice insurance to be prohibitively high and thereliire
carry only limited coverage or no coverage at all. James M. Rifkin and B. Andrew Rilkin, When
Doctors Go Bare: Compensation Beyond the Undetinsured Physician, 73 MICH. B.J. 1080, 1080 (1994).
If faced with a damage award greater than their coverage plus what they can afford out of pocket,
those physicians who chose to practice with little or no coverage may simply declare bankruptcy
to avoid meeting the recovery obligation. Id, The loser of the physician's gamble, of course, is
the injured plaintiff left bearing substantial injury. Id. For example, consider Rosa Rodrigue/,'s
baby daughter, Ana. See Harvey Wachsman, New York Forum About Medicine: Abu. Hares Free
Ride, NEwsnAY, Mar. 15, 1993, at 40. During a botched abortion, Dr. Abu Hayat severed Ana's
antl, leaving her in need of physical therapy fur the rest. of her life. Id, Because Dr. Dayat carried
tm malpractice insurance, Ana and her mother will be left to hear the onerous and costly burden
of his negligence. Id. Thus, although many medical malpractice plaintiffs will be able to recover
some amount against negligent physicians, others will be left without recourse because they had
the misfortune of visiting an uninsured physician. See id.
29
 Compare Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical Serv., 868 F. Stipp. 110, 114 (1). Md. 1994)
(holding for ER1SA preemption of vicarioits liability malpractice claims brought against managed
care orgainizations) and Visconti v. United States Health Care, 857 F. Stipp. 1097, 11(15 (E.D. Pa.
1 994) (same), rend sub nom. Dukes v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1994)
and Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Stipp. 125, 129 (D.N.1J. 1994) (same) and Nealy v. United States
Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Stipp. 966, 975 (S.D.NX 1994) (same) and Ricci, 840 F. Stipp. at 318
816	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 37:4
decisions within individual districts. 30
 In July of 1995, in Pacificare of
Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit issued the first circuit court decision addressing this
specific issue and held that vicarious liability malpractice claims against
managed care organizations do not trigger ERISA preemption. 31
This Note explores the arguments in favor of preemption as well
as those opposing preemption of vicarious liability claims against man-
aged care organizations and concludes that the arguments against
preemption are ultimately more persuasive. 32
 Further, this Note argues
that a 1995 unanimous decision by the United States Supreme Court,
New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance
Co., bolsters the argument against preemption." Part I of this Note
provides a general background on managed care and reviews state
common law theories of liability of managed care organizations)" Part
II introduces and explains the history of ERISA and then discusses the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA's preemption
clause in a variety of settings." Part III presents the reasoning of district
courts' decisions finding that ERISA preempts common law vicarious
liability claims against managed care providers. 36 Part IV discusses the
decisions holding against preemption of such claims." Part V argues
that, in Travelers, the United States Supreme Court bolstered the argu-
ment against preemption of vicarious liability claims against managed
care organizations. 38
(same) with Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Stipp, 820, 826 (D. Md. 1995) (holding against ERISA
preemption of vicarious liability malpractice claims brought against managed care organizations)
and Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Ill. 1994) (same) and Kearney
v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp, 182, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (same) and Smith v. HMO
Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669, 672 (N.D. III. 1994) (same) and Elsesser v. Hospital of Phila.
College, 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (same) and Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith,
733 F. Supp. 983, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (same).
"The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has issued conflicting decisions. Compare Visconti, 857
F. Supp. at 1105 (holding in favor of preemption) with Elsesser, 802 F. Supp. at 1290 (holding
against preemption). The District of Maryland has also issued conflicting decisions. Compare
Pomeroy, 868 F. Stipp. at 114 (holding in favor of preemption) with Jackson, 878 E Supp. at 826
(holding against preemption).
31
 59 KM 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995),
32 See infra Parts I—V.
33 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995). See infra notes 378-40.1 and accompanying text.
3.1 See infra notes 39-107 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 108-220 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 221-76 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 277-349 and accompanying text.
3" See Infra notes 350-416 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of Managed Care
Over the last several years, the popularity of managed care has
increased dramatically as an alternative to conventional fee-for-service
medical insurance. 3  Traditionally, if a person were ill or injured, that
person would visit any physician that he or she desired and would send
the bill to his or her insurance company, which would then simply pay
the bill for whatever services the physician had provided.° Under this
traditional fee-for-service method of payment, however, health care
costs increased rapidly over the past quarter century. 41 Whereas the
Consumer Price Index ("CPI") increased 235.5% from 1971 to 1991,
health care expenditures increased 398.9%, a rate of increase seventy
percent greater than that of the CP1. 42 Furthermore, between 1980
and 1993, United States national health expenditures increased from
$251.1 billion to $884.2 billion.° As a percentage of gross domestic
product, health care expenditures increased from 9.3% to 13.9% over
the same time period."
The structure of the traditional fee-for-service method of provid-
ing medical care has contributed significantly to this rapid increase,"
Under the fee-for-service model, insurance companies pay physicians
for whatever procedures they prescribe.° Under this system, physicians
have an incentive to over-prescribe care: if a physician's income is tied
to the number and costs of procedures he or she performs, it follows
a physician can increase his or her income by prescribing more (and
more expensive) procedures." This incentive to over-prescribe is mani-
fested in several ways.° Freed from the burden of cost consideration,
a physician may perform procedures or tests in borderline cases, "just
59 See Laura A. Scolea, The Development and Growth of Employer-Provided Health Insurance,
117 Mosmitx LAB. ItKv. 3, 7 (Mar. 1994).
11 Wasted Health Care Dollars, CONSIUMI.:12 REP., July 1, 1992, at 436.
' 11 Sco1ea, supra note 39, at 7.
4'2 Id.
45 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEI''T o HEM: Ell AND HUMAN SERVICES,
UNITED STATES 219 (1995).
' 1 Id.
Wasted Health Care Dollars, .supra note 40, at 436.
44i hi. A consequence of the fee-for-service method of payment has been that physicians may
not consider the costs of a given procedure in deciding whether or not to prescribe it. hi. at 438.
Several studies have concluded that physicians frequently do not know the costs of the procedures
That i hey prescribe. Id.
47 See id, at 438-39.
4H See id. at 439.
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to be on the safe side."'" Physicians may also engage in the practice of
"defensive medicine," performing services that are of little or no value
to the patient, but are recommended as a precaution against medical
malpractice claims.'" Physicians may also refer patients for treatment
in facilities in which they have financial interests. 5 ' Or, physicians may
prescribe patently unnecessary, at times even unhealthy, procedures."
One 1992 estimate put the cost of unnecessary care at more than two
hundred million dollars."
Managed care attempts to reduce health care costs in part by
changing the system of incentives under which physicians operate. 54
Generally, managed care organizations compensate physicians on a per
patient rather than a fee-for-service basis. 55 The organization grants the
physician a set fee for each patient on a monthly basis, regardless of
the care provided." Because the physician's income is not tied to the
number, type or expense of the procedures performed, he or she will
be less likely to prescribe unnecessary and wasteful procedures, thus
decreasing the costs of health care. 57
 Ideally, the patient's needs—and
not the potential income stemming from those needs—will dictate the
physician's prescription of treatment." In the managed care setting,
primary care physicians typically serve as "gatekeepers" to higher levels
of care." All patients must first visit a primary care physician, who will
refer only those patients whose condition warrants more expensive,
specialized care."" As a further means of cutting health care costs,
managed care organizations engage in "utilization review" to monitor
49
 Victor R. Fuchs, No Pain, Na Gain: Perspectives on Cost Containment, 269 JAMA (131, 631
1993).
rsr
5 I
 Wasted Health Care Dollars, supra note 40, at 439. This practice is known as "self referral."
Id. A Florida State University' study estimated Mat in Florida, physician-owned laboratories per-
formed twice as many tests per patient as independently owned labs. Id. A University olArizona
study estimated that physicians who had diagnostic imaging equipment, such as computerized
tomography ("CT scan") or magnetic resonance imaging ("MR1") machines, in their offices order
four limes inure imaging exams than physicians who referred patients elsewhere for tests. Id.
52 Fuchs, .supra note 49, at 631. For example, various researchers have estimated that up to
50% of caesarian sections, 27% of hysterectomies and 16% of tonsilectomies are performed
unnecessarily. Wasted Health Care Dollars, supra note 40, at 441.
" Wasted Health Care Dollars, supra note 40, at 435.
5 ' 1 See Scofea, supra note 39, at 7.
55 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 2 HEALTH LAW 53 (1995).
Sedohn K Iglehart, Health folic Report: The American Health Care System, Managed Care,
327 Naw ENc. J. Man. 742, 743 (1992).
57 See St:ohm. supra note 39, at 7; Wasted Health Care Dollars, supra note 40, at 436.
58
 See Wasted Health Care Dollars, .supra note 40, at 438-39.
w Iglehart, supra note 56, at 745.
cot) Id.
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and evaluate the medical necessity and appropriateness of their physi-
cians' prescriptions of treatment."'
Managed care refers to care delivery systems that provide compre-
hensive health care services to an enrolled membership for a fixed
fee."2 Three types of health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") con-
stitute major vehicles of managed care delivery—the staff model, the
group model and the independent practice association ("IPA")
model." A staff model HMO employs its own salaried physicians, treat-
ing only HMO patients in a facility owned and operated by the HMO."
A group model HMO contracts with a group of physicians, generally
a practice association, to devote much of its time to caring for HMO
members at the group's facilities for a fixed monthly fee per cov-
ered individual."5 In the IPA model, the HMO contracts with an inde-
pendent association of physicians which in turn contracts with each of
its dependent physicians to provide care to HMO members in his or
her own office." In both the group and IPA model, the participating
physicians may also see patients that do not belong to the HMO.G7 A
1990 study found that 8.8% of HM.O participants were enrolled in staff
model HMOs, 21.6% in group model HMOs and 67.1% in IPAs." 8
An equally popular managed care delivery system is the preferred
provider organization ("PPO"). In 1994, the American Medical Care
and Review Association estimated that nearly fifty-five million Ameri-
cans were enrolled in PPOs.e9 A PPO is typically a network of physicians
and hospitals that contracts to provide care to a defined group of
61 How to Put a Lid on Health Plan Costs Without Giving Up All Your Options, PRocrr-liunx-
ING STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS OWNERS, Sept. I, 1990, at Ii, available in WESTLAW,
PROFBLDCST, File No. '2516483. Utilization review has been somewhat controversial and may
be another source of liability fur managed care organizations engaging in the process. See
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321,1326 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
812 (1992) (plaintiff sued a managed care organization, alleging that the organization's utiliza-
tion review process deprived her of medically necessary treatment which led to the death or her
fetus); infra notes 225-34 and accompanying text fur discussion of the case. In Corcoran, the
United States Court or Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that ERISA preempted plaintiff's action.
Id. at 1334.
FURROW FE A .supra note 55 'It 53.
°See Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the
Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. '285,29'2 (1995).
IA Id.
Id. at 292-93.
rn Id. at 293.
67 FURROW F1 AL., supra note 55, at 54.
68 Id.
69 Paul J. Kenkcl, PPOs Panne New Links . with Providers, Mon.	 1,11 !CAR E, Mar. 14,1994,
at 42.
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patients on a fee-for-service basis.'" PPOs are able to offer discounts of
approximately twenty percent to subscribers using plan-designated hos-
pitals and physicians because the PPO system provides an assured
volume of business and prompt payment."' PPOs also assess penalties
in the form of higher deductibles and co-payments against subscribers
who use non-designated hospitals and physicians. 72 Recently, managed
care systems have grown in popularity as a means of providing more
cost-effective yet still medically comprehensive health care." In 1994,
the Group Health Association of America found that in the last fifteen
years the number of persons enrolled in HMOs increased five-fold,
from less than ten million in 1982 to an expected fifty-six million in
1995, 74
 In 1995, the Wall Street Journal estimated that managed care
health plans cover sixty-three percent of the under sixty-five employee
market, twenty-three percent of Medicaid recipients and nine percent
of Medicare recipien ts. 75
 It is estimated that at least half of all practicing
physicians are involved in a managed care organization."
Although the long-term cost effects of managed care are highly
speculative and equally highly disputed, some recent studies have in-
dicated that managed care has reduced health care costs.'" For exam-
ple, a 1995 study conducted by KPMG Peat Marwick, a management
consulting firm, calculated that in 1993, hospital costs in areas with
high levels of managed care were 11.5% lower than the national aver-
age, whereas such costs in areas with only moderate levels of managed
care were 3.6% higher than the average." The study further found that
in areas with high levels of managed care, hospital stays were 16.9%
shorter than expected for patients with similar medical conditions,
whereas in areas with low levels of managed care, hospital stays were
17.5% longer than expected."
7" How to Put a Lid on Health Plan Costs, supra note 61, ai 6.
71
72 See John Lewis Smith III and Lawrence L. Lamade, Preferred Provider Plans Break New Legal
Ground, Li AI. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1983, ed. 1, at 27.
75 See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 63, at 287; Scofea, supra note 39, at 7.
74 See Marie Gordon, HMOs Post Member Growth, BosToN HERALD, Dec. 8, 1994, at 45.
75 George Anders & Laurie McGinley, Managed Eldercare: HMOs are Signing Up New Class
of Member: The Group in Medicare, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1995, at Al. A 1993 article estimated that
managed care systems will cover between 70% and 80% of insured persons by 1997. George
Anders, Rolnist Profits Seen for HMOs in 2nd Quartet, WALL Sr. J., July 6, 1993, at A7A.
7" Igieliart, supra note 56, at 793.
77 See, e.g., Hospital Casts, Patient Stays Lower in Managed Care Settings, I Managed Care Rep.
(BNA) 20 (July 5, 1995).
"Id.
79 a
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With the rise of managed care has come a corresponding rise in
the frequency of malpractice suits against managed care organiza-
tions.m Prior to the emergence of managed care, courts had applied
traditional notions of agency and tort to vicarious liability malprac-
tice claims against hospitals and other medical care institutions. 51 The
common law adapted to the rise of managed care by applying much
of the same reasoning in vicarious liability malpractice suits against
managed care organizations that it had applied to similar suits against
hospitals.82
B. Common Law Theories of Recovery Against Managed
Care Organizations fir the Malpractice of Their
Physicians and Other Health Care Personnel
The common law of many states allows a victim of malpractice to
recover from a managed care organization for the negligence of its
health care providers." Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a
managed care organization may be held liable for the negligent acts
of its employees and agents." Plaintiffs bringing suit under the doc-
trine of vicarious liability typically proceed under one of two general
theories: respondeat superior or ostensible agency. 85
Under the theory of respondeat superior, a plaintiff must prove
that the provider performed negligently, that there was a direct em-
ployment relationship between the managed care organization and the
provider, and that the provider was acting within the scope of his or
her employment when the alleged malpractice occurred. 86 The avail-
ability of respondeat superior theory is limited to plaintiffs participat-
ing in staff model HMOs, because the staff model HMO is the only
system where the provider is in a direct employment relationship with
g" William A. Chittenden In, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care: History and
Prognosis, 26 Towr & INS. U. 451, 453 (1991).
81 See id, at 454.
82 Id.
83 See, e.g.. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Merl. Or, 547 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(holding that HMO may he liable for negligent treatment of an affiliated physician); Sloan v.
Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that HMO
may hi; liable ftw negligent treatment of staff physician).
84 See 12.r.sTA•EmEN• (S•COND) or AGENCY § 251 (1958) ("A principal is subject to liability
for physical harm to the person or the tangible things of another caused by the negligence of a
servant or non-servant...."); Wn.t.inm L. PROSSER, 'I'M: LAW (IL. - Toms §§ 69-74, at 458-93 (4th
ed. 1971).
85 0. Mark Zamora, Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance Organizations: Evolving
Theories and ERISA's Impact, 19 Novn L. REv. 1047, 1048 (1995).
86 Chittenden supra note 80, at 453-54.
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the organization.87
 For example, the Indiana Court of Appeals deter-
mined in Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, Inc., that a direct em-
ployment relationship arguably existed where a staff model HMO
engaged physicians by written "employment contracts" that referred to
the HMO as "Employer" and provided for an annual salary as well as
a benefits package." Furthermore, the HMO exercised control over
the physicians by means of a medical director who set policy and
monitored medical services."' Because these features could create a
reasonable inference that an employment relationship existed between
the HMO and its physicians, the court denied the HMO's motion for
summary judgment and held that the HMO could be liable for the
malpractice of its physicians. 9°
Conversely, in group or IPA model HMOs and in PPOs, which
constitute the majority of managed care organizations, the health care
providers are usually independent contractors, not employees, of the
organization."' Participants in such plans have therefore relied upon
the doctrine of "ostensible agency," which allows recovery from a prin-
cipal for the actions of an independent contractor if the independent
contractor is an apparent agent of the principal."2 Under the ostensible
agency doctrine, a patient may recover from a managed care organi-
zation for the malpractice of its independent contractor physicians
where (a) there is a likelihood that patients will look to the managed
care organization rather than the individual physician for care, and
(b) the managed care organization "holds out" the physician as its
employee." When determining whether the patient looks to the or-
Sia! Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 63, at 299, 300-01.
88 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1105, 1109 (Ind. C.t. App, 1987).
89 Id. at 1109.
90 Id.
91
 .Sp' Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 63, at 301, 305-06.
92 Id. at 31{}. WEBSTER'S TIDRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1597 (1986) defines osten-
sible agency as "agency by estoppel arising when a principal has intentionally or negligently
caused a third person to believe and rely upon the apparent authority of his supposed agent even
though it has not been given." The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965) provides:
One who emp14.)ys an independent contractor to perform services for another which
are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the
employer or his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the
negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the same extent as
though the employer were supplying them himself or by his servants.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958) similarly provides:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes
a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is
subject to liability to the third pet -son for harm caused by the lack of care or skill
of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.
1)3 SFr, r.g., Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. 1988).
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ganization for care, courts consider factors such as the degree of
control the plan exerts over physician selection and whether the phy-
sician's malpractice arose out of "the performance of an inherent
function" of the plan."' Whether the organization "holds out" the
physician as its employee depends on representations made by the
organization to the patient.•'
In Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania denied a defendant HMO's motion for summary judg-
ment and allowed a plaintiff to bring suit against the HMO for the
malpractice of two participating physicians." In performing a biopsy
of Chardella Boyd's breast tissue, Dr. Erwin Cohen perforated her
chest wall with the biopsy needle."'' Two months later, Ms. Boyd con-
sulted Dr. David Rosenthal, who had originally referred her to Dr.
Cohen for the biopsy, and Dr. Perry Dornstein about persistent chest
pains."8 After performing a series of tests, Dr. Rosenthal sent Ms. Boyd
home to. rest." Later that clay she was found dead of a myocardial
infarction.'" Because the defendant HMO restricted physician selec-
tion to a limited list, received payment directly from plan participants
and used its primary care physicians as gatekeepers to higher level care,
the court denied the defendant HMO's motion for summary judgment
and concluded that a reasonable jury could infer that the HMO had
held out the physicians as its employees.m The court also reasoned
that a reasonable jury could infer that Ms. Boyd looked to the defen-
dant HMO rather than to the individual physicians for care. 1 "2 Holding
that the physicians in question arguably were ostensible agents of the
HMO, the court concluded that the HMO may be liable for the phy-
sicians' negligence.u' 3
Prior to the early 1990s, managed care organizations defended
vicarious liability malpractice claims under the common law available
to them.R" Over the past five years, however, a new trend has emerged
91 Gilittenden, supra now HO, at 454, 459.
It
 Id. at 460.
"517 A.2d at 1235.
1)7 1d. at 1230.
UN Id.
" Id.
1191
1 " 1
 Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1235.
[112 Id.
1113 hi,
1 " Presently, because E RISA only controls employee benefit. plans, state common law contin-
ues to control claims brought by plaintiffs who are insured through means other than their
employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a). Such persons, however, represent only a minority of those who
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in the way managed care organizations defend such suits.L 05 Managed
care organizations that administer health care as part of an em-
ployee benefits package have increasingly defended such claims by
arguing that ERISA completely preempts vicarious liability malpractice
claims." This argument has been widely successful for defendant man-
aged care organizations and has sparked great debate among federal
district courts.' 07
ERISA AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE "PREEMPTION CLAUSE"
Responding to what it perceived as a rapid "growth in size, scope
and numbers" of private employee benefit plans, in 1974, Congress
enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA" ). 1 °8
Because of the wage freezes during World War II and the Korean War,
employers had increasingly looked towards employee benefit plans as
a form of deferred compensation." During the post-World War II
years, the use of such plans expanded significantly: whereas in 1940
approximately four million employees were covered by private em-
ployee benefit plans, that number had risen to more than thirty million
by the early 1970s, a figure representing almost half of the nation's
private non-agricultural work force."'
By the early 1970s, Congress had found that its previous at-
tempts to regulate private employee benefit plans had proven wholly
insufficient.'" One such attempt, its 1958 Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act ("WPPDA"), required plan administrators to file with
the Secretary of Labor and furnish to plan participants and their
beneficiaries, upon written request, a description and annual report of
the plan." 2 The WPPDA, however, made no substantive demands upon
plan administrators regarding plan accounting procedures, admini-
are insured. See Karen Davis et al., Choke Matters: Enrollees' Views on Their Health Plans, 14
HEALTH Arr. 99, 100 (Summer 1995). Indeed, as of 1994 an estimated 63% of the non-elderly
population was covered by employee benefit plans. Id.
" IS
 See (Nut:Eiden, supra note 80, at 485.
111'
"7 Id. at 485 11.171; see also info notes 221-349 and accompanying text.
1 "" 20 U.S.C. § 1001.
m9 H.R. Rio'. No.93-533, at 2 (1973), reininterl in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640. In 1942,
Congress enacted the Stabilization Act, which limited employee wage increases but allowed
employee insurance plans. Scofea, supra note 39, at 6.
110 11.8. Ry.r. No. 93-533, al 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641.
111 /d. at. 4642.
112 hi.
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stration or vesting rights." 3 In 1962, Congress amended the WPPDA
and established as federal crimes theft, embezzlement, bribery and
kickbacks occurring in connection with welfare and pension plans. 14
Despite this legislation, employee benefit plans were still subject
to widespread and relatively unchecked abuse.""Furthermore, because
the amended WPPDA only required disclosure at the request of em-
ployees, employees bore the burden of policing their own individual
plans."" Consequently, employees with many years of service often
found that their benefits had not vested for some undisclosed reason." 7
Many employees and their dependents similarly lost benefits upon
the premature termination of plans by plan administrators or their
employers. "K
In addition to finding the amended WPPDA ineffective, Congress
in the early 1970s also recognized that the total value of assets in private
benefit plans was more than $150 billion, the largest amount of private
money to have thus far escaped effective federal regulation."' Such a
large sum of money had the potential power of influencing national
savings levels, the operation of capital markets, the financial security
of millions of individuals and the flow of interstate commerce.' 2" Rec-
ognizing the magnitude of money controlled by private employee
benefit plans, the millions of lives affected by the plans and the failure
of past legislation which provided "only indirect, partial, or sporadic
protection of participants, pensioners, and their beneficiaries," Con-
gress enacted ERISA to bring the entire field of employee benefit plans
under a uniform federal statutory scheme.' 2 '
ERISA covers all employee benefit plans "maintained by an em-
ployer . . . for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise" medical
'' See id.; Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. MI. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997, 997-1003, repealed 11
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 4 1031(a) (1) (1994).
" 4 H.R. REA.. No. 93-533, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642; Act of Mar, 20,
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35, 41-42, repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1031(0(1) (1994).
115 See. H.R. Rio'. No. 93-533, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.GA.N. 4639, 4642.
in; ird.
117 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
118
119 1 . I.R. REM No. 93533, at 3, reprinted in 1974 U,S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641,
12" Id.. at 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640.
1 :41 Id; Jay Conison, ERISA and the. Language of Preemption, 72 WASI I. U. L. Rev. 619, 642
(1994).
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or other benefits.' 22
 Congress's avowed purpose in enacting ERISA was
to "protect interstate commerce . . . and the interests of participants
in employee benefit plans" by initiating reporting and disclosure re-
quirements and by establishing federal standards of conduct for those
running such benefit plans.'" Congress further sought to establish
uniform minimum standards regarding requirements of the vesting of
plan benefits, fiscal responsibility of plan administrators and disclosure
of plan specifics.' 24
 Concerned that a full one-half of all non-agricul-
tural private employees remained without the coverage of any sort of
retirement plan, Congress hoped that ERISA's clear and uniformly
regulated statutory scheme would encourage employers to further
expand their use of employee benefit plans. 125
In furtherance of its goal of "providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts,"' 26 ERISA provides a
civil remedy provision that enumerates causes of action by which vari-
ous plaintiffs may bring suit against employee benefit plans.' 27 Under
the civil remedy provision, a plan beneficiary may sue the plan for,
among other things, refusal to provide required information, denial
of benefit rights, breach of fiduciary duty and enforcement of ERISA's
provisions.' 28
 The civil remedy provision provides no cause of action
for vicarious liability claims brought against managed care organiza-
122 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1003. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) further defines a plan covered by the
stainte as
[a]ny employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained—
(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce; or
(2) by any employee organization or organizations representing employees engaged
in commerce or in any industry affecting commerce; or
(3) by both.
Id. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(6) exempts from ERISA coverage
hthiy employee benefit plan if=
(1) such plan is a governmental plan ... ;
(2) such plan is a church plan . ;
(3) such plan is maintained solely liar the purposes of complying with applicable
workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability laws;
(4) such plan is maintained outside of the United States primarily for the benefit
of persons substantially all of whom are nonresident aliens; or
(5) such plan is an excess benefit plan ... and is unfunded.
Id.
I " fd § 1001 (0 .
12 ' 1 Irl. § 1001(b).
125 S. Rep. Nu. 93-383, at 9 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4900; 14.R. RE I'. No.
93-533, at 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4640.
l 2u29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
127 Id. § 1132.
izt;
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tions affiliated with an ERISA plan and is thus of no help to a plaintiff
attempting to bring such a claim.' 2"
To ensure uniform regulation of employee benefit plans, Congress
included in ERISA a broad preemption clause.'" ERISA section 514(a)
provides that the act "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan de-
scribed in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under 1003 (b)
of this title.""' Yet Congress also expressly limited this broadly worded
proclamation, stating in section 514(b) (2), the "savings clause," that
the preemption clause "shall [not.) be construed to exempt or relieve
any person from any law of any state which regulates insurance, bank-
ing, or securities.""2
 Recognizing, however, that states might attempt
to pass laws regulating employee benefit plans under the guise of
regulating insurance, Congress also included section 514(b) (2)(B),
the "deemer clause," which states that neither employee benefit plans
nor trusts established under such plans "shall be deemed to he an
insurance company . . . for the purposes of State law purporting to
regulate insurance companies . . . ."""
ERISA's definition of "State law" includes "all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any
State" and encompasses both state statutes and common law causes of
action, such as vicarious liability malpractice claims. 194 Consequently,
the preemption clause has become a major source of confusion as to
whether a plaintiff may recover from a managed care organization for
the negligence of its physicians."' Courts deciding this issue must
determine exactly what sorts of state laws Congress intended ERISA to
preempt. 1 " Prior to 1995, federal district courts had been unable to
look to higher courts for guidance on the specific issue of whether
ERISA preempts vicarious liability malpractice claims against managed
123 See id.
13"1.1.R. Rtip. No. 93-533, at 17, reprinted in. 1974 U.S.C.C.A,N. 4639, 4655 ("Because of the
interstate character of employee benefit plans, ... it lis] essential to provide 6n . a uniform source
of law in lieu of burdensome multiple" adininistration.).
131 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a).
122 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (A).
133 M. § 1144(b) (2) (B).
134 See id.	 1144(c)(1).
136 COMPUIT Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical Serv., 868 F. Supp. 110, 114 (D. Md. 1994)
(holding that ERISA preempts vicarious liability malpractice claims against managed care organi-
zations) With Haas v. Group Health Plan, 875 F. Stipp. 544, 549 (S.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that.
ERISA does not tweempt vicarious liability malpractice claims against Managed care organiza-
tions).
136 See, e.g., Airports Co. v. Custom Benefits Serv. of Austin, Inc., 28 1 2.3d 1062, 1064-65 (10th
Cir. 1994); United Wire v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1195 (3d Cir. 1993).
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care organizations. 157 The United States Supreme Court and the circuit
courts of appeals, however, had developed a sizable body of case law
on ERISA preemption in a variety of other settings.';" Therefore, dis-
trict courts have looked to this body of law for guidance in determining
whether ERISA preempts vicarious liability malpractice claims.'"
In 1981, in Alessi v. Raybeslos-Manhattan, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted a New Jersey statute that
prohibited private pension plans from reducing a retiree's benefits by
the amount the retiree received in workers' compensation awards
subsequent to retirement."' The Court stated that respect for the
separate spheres of federal and state authority established by the fed-
eralist system should govern determinations of federal preemption of
state law.''" Therefore, absent persuasive reasons, such as a clear ex-
pression of congressional intent, the Court should be reluctant to hold
a federal statute to preempt a state law.' 42
 The Court found, however,
the explicit congressional statement about the preemptive effect of
section 514(a) to be a great help in determining Congress's intent in
enacting ERISA, thus significantly simplifying its task.' 43
 The Court.
interpreted the preemption clause's proclamation that ERISA shall
"supersede any and all State laws insofar as they . . relate to any
employee benefit plan" as a clear indication that Congress intended to
establish the regulation of employee benefit plans as "exclusively a
federal concern."'"
In Alessi, the Court reasoned that the statute at issue "related to"
ERISA plans within the meaning of section 514(a) because the statu-
tory provisions prohibiting benefit offsets based on workers' compen-
sation benefits effectively eliminated one method of calculating pen-
sion benefits permitted by federal law." 5 The Court concluded that
upholding a statutory provision that precluded on the state level a
137 Sea Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 153 (10111 Cir, 1995).
138
 See infra notes 140-234 and accompanying text.
190 Sec infra limes 219-349 and accompanying text.
1 'F0 451 U.S. 504, 507, 526 (1981). Whereas the 1977 amendments to the state's Workers'
Compensation Act allowed plans to reduce disability benefits or payments by the amount of
worker's compensation received by the plan participant, they expressly precluded such reduction
of retirement benefits. Id. at 508 (citing N.J. Sm'i'. ANN. § 34:15-29 (West Stipp. 1980-1981) (as
amended by Laws, ch. 156)).
" 1 /d. at 522.
142
149
144 See id. at 523; .ser? also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 4t, 45-46 (1987) (holding
ERISA to preempt state common law tortions breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties and
fraud in inducement claims).
145 /4/gcsi, 451 U.S. at 524.
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method of accounting acceptable at the federal level would be incon-
sistent with Congress's explicitly articulated desire to bring the regula-
tion of employee benefit plans under a uniform federal system." 6 The
Court held that ERISA therefore preempted the state statute. 147
In 1983, in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the United States Supreme
Court held that ERISA preempted provisions of two New York statutes,
the Human Rights Law and the Disability Benefits Law, which forbade
discrimination based on pregnancy in employee benefit plans and
required employers to pay benefits to employees unable to work be-
cause of pregnancy."' The Court first explained that defining what
Congress meant by the phrase "relate to" is the key to determining the
extent of the preemption clause's reach, and ultimately to determine
whether ERISA preempts a state law." 9
 The Court noted that the broad
scope of ERISA's preemption clause is evident from the plain language
of the statute. 15" The Court characterized section 514(a) as an explicit
articulation of Congress's intention to ensure governance of employee
benefit plans by a uniform body of federal law.''' The Court stated that
Congress aimed to minimize the burden, confusion and expense that
complying with conflicting state and federal laws would impose upon
plan administrators.' 52
 The Court reasoned that the explicit statutory
language "relate to" reflects Congress's desire to preempt not only state
laws that directly affect employee benefit plans, but also state laws that
indirectly infringe upon ERISA's exclusive control over the field of
employee benefit plans.'" Although recognizing that some state laws
might "affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote or periph-
eral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan,"
the Court stated that it would construe the phrase extremely broadly
and hold that a law relates to an employee benefit plan "if it has a
connection with or refrence to such a plan."''"
146 See id. at 524-25.
147 1(1. at 526.
145 463 U.S. 85,88,89,108-09 (1983). New York's Human Rights Law, a general anti-discrimi-
nation statute, forbade discrimination based on a variety of conditions or characteristics, includ-
ing pregnancy. Id. at 88 (citing N.Y. Excii. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982 and Stipp. 1982-
1983)). New York's Disability Benefits Law required employers to pay benefits to employees
unable to work because of a variety of non-occupational illnesses, including pregnancy. Id. at 89
(citing N.Y, Woitx. Contr. LAW §§ 220-242 (McKinney 1965 and Stipp. 1982-1983)).
112 See id. at 96.
151
 See id. at 105 &I -1.25 (citing Alessi, 451 U.S. at 523).
152 Id. at 105 n.25,107-08.
152 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98.
154 Id. at 96-97,100 n.2I (emphasis added).
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The Shaw Court found support for its expansive interpretation of
"relate to" in ERISA's legislative history. 155 In hearings prior to enacting
ERISA, both the House and Senate sponsors underscored the broad
scope of the preemption clause; Representative John H. Dent hailed
the reservation of exclusive power over employee benefit plans to the
federal government as "ERISA's crowning achievement," while Senator
Harrison A. Williams stated that the preemption clause was "intended
to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments
.. which have the force and effect of law."' 56 The Shaw Court noted
that while the bills originally introduced into the House and the Senate
both limited preemption to the subject matters directly regulated
by ERISA, the version later enacted contained no such restriction. 157
Moreover, the Court reasoned that if Congress intended to limit the
scope of preemption to only those statutes dealing directly with ERISA,
it would not have exempted from preemption state laws regulating
insurance or generally applicable state criminal laws, nor would it have
included a civil enforcement provision.' 58
The Court found that the Human Rights Law "related to" ERISA
plans because the statute, which prohibited employers from structur-
ing their benefit plans in such a way as to discriminate based on
pregnancy, made reference to such plans.' 59 Limiting its holding to
preempt the Human Rights Law only insofar as it pertained to ERISA
plans, the Court pointed out that ERISA preemption had no effect on
the statute's prohibition of employment discrimination in hiring, pro-
motion and salary.'('" Finally, the Court held that New York's Disability
Benefits Law "related to" ERISA plans because the statute required
employers to pay specific benefits to employees.' 6' Although the Court
did not hold ERISA to preempt the Disability Benefits Law, it did hold
that New York could not enforce the statute by means of regulating
ERISA plans. 162
The Supreme Court has had little trouble applying the portion of
the Shaw decision that defined the scope of "relate to" as including
155 /d. at 98-99.
156 hi. at 09.
157 /d. at 98.
158 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text for discussion of
§ 514(b) exemptions from the preemption clause. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying
text finr coverage of § 502, the civil remedies provision.
158 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97.
1151 141. at 97 n.17.
161 M. at 97.
162 Id. at 109.
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state laws that make "reference to" employee benefit plans.'" For
instance, in 1988, in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Services, Inc.,
the Court held that ERISA preempted a Georgia statute proscribing
garnishment of employee benefits.'" The statute at issue in Mackey
specifically exempted from all garnishment proceedings benefits of an
employee benefit plan subject to the provisions of ERISA except those
based upon a judgment for child support. 165
 Emphasizing that the
statute not only made specific reference to ERISA plans, but applied
exclusively to them, the Court reasoned that the statute necessarily
"related to" ERISA plans.' 6"ERISA, therefore, preempted the statute. 167
In 1990, in FMC Corp. v. Holliday, the United States Supreme
Court held that ERISA preempted a Pennsylvania statute that prohib-
ited employee benefit plans from subrogating a claimant's tort recov-
ery. 168 In FMC Corp., an employee and his family were members of FMC
Salaried Health Care Plan, an employee benefit plan under the terms
of ERISA." When the employee's daughter was seriously injured in an
automobile accident, FMC paid a portion of her medical expenses."'
The daughter later recovered damages in a negligence action that
she brought against the other driver involved in the accident, and
FMC brought suit seeking reimbursement for the amount it had ex-
pended."' Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law,
however, precluded employee benefit plans from exercising subroga-
tion or reimbursement rights on a plan participant's tort recovery." 2
Yet, the Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania statute "related to"
ERISA plans because it referred to benefit plans which may be gov-
erned by ERISA."' Therefore, the Court held that ERISA preempted
the anti-subrogation statute and allowed FMC to proceed in its subro-
gation actionP
163 See id. al. 96-97 (stating that a law "'relates to' an employee benefit plan . , it it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan") (emphasis added).
164 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988).
165 1d, at 828 & n.2 (citing GA. COOP: ANN. § 18-4-22 (1982)).
166 Id. at 829, 830.
Iv Id.
160 498 U.S. 52, 55, 65 (1990).
105 Id. at 54,
176 Id. at 54-55.
171
 Id. at 55.
172 Id. at 55 & 11.1 (citing PA. CONS. STAT. § 1720 (1987).
175 FMC, 498 U.S. at 59, 65. The statute protected from subrogation all benefits received
through "[a]ny program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits." Id. at
55 (citing PA. CONS. STAT. § 1719 (1987)).
174
 Id. at 65.
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In 1992, in District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade,
the United States Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted a District
of Columbia statute requiring employers who provide health coverage
to also provide equivalent coverage to injured employees eligible for
workers' compensation benefits) 75 The Court concluded that the the
District of Columbia statute referred to ERISA plans as a baseline for
determining the level of coverage the statute mandated for injured
workers.' 76 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the statute's mere ref-
erence to such plans provided a sufficient relationship between the
statute and the plan to mandate preemption.'"
In contrast to the consistency with which the Court has applied
Shaw's holding that ERISA preempts statutes referring to ERISA plans,
the Court has had much more difficulty applying the portion of the
Shaw decision that interprets "relate to" to include state laws that have
a "connection with" employee benefit plans.' 78 In 1987, in Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, the United States Supreme Court held that.
ERISA preempted a plaintiff's state law claims against his insurer's
tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties and fraud in the
inducement.' 79 The plaintiff alleged that his insurer had improperly
processed his claim for permanent disability stemming from a back
injury, resulting in a loss of benefits.'" In reaching its decision, the
Court relied upon the expansive sweep of the preemption clause es-
tablished in S'haw. 181 The Court reasoned that the plaintiff's common
law claims amounted to allegations of improper processing of a claim
and thus attacked plan administration.' 82 Actions challenging plan
administration, the Court concluded, necessarily "relate to" plans and
therefore are subject to preemption) The Court further reasoned
175 113 3, Ct., 580, 582 (1992). The District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Equity
Amendment Act of 1990 provided in relevant part: "Any employer who provides health insurance
coverage for an employee shall provide health insurance coverage equivalent [to the employee's
existing coverage] while the employee receives or is eligible to receive workers' compensation
benefits . . Id. (citing D.C. CODE: ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(1) (Supp. 1992)).
176 Id. at 584. ERNA § 3(1) defines plans covered by the statute in part as "any plan, fluid,
or program which [is] maintained by an employer . . . for the purpose of providing [benefits]
for its participants and their beneficiaries." 29 U.S.0 § 1002(1) (1994).
177 Greater Wash. Rd. qf Trade, 113 S. Ct. at 583.
318 See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (stating that a law "'relates to' an
employee benefit plan .....it has a connection with or reference to such a plan") (emphasis
added).
179 481 U.S. 41, 43, 57 (1987).
' 8° Id. at 43.
isi Id. at 47.
182 See id. at 48.
189 See id. at 47-48.
July 19961
	
E/?L'in AND VICARIOUS LIABILTLY	 833
that Congress intended that the civil remedy provisions set forth in
ERISA section 502(a) to be the exclusive vehicle by which plan partici-
pants may sue to recover benefits due under the plan, to enforce rights
under the plan or to clarify rights to future benefits.'" The Court
concluded that allowing varying state law remedies to supplement the
remedies provided in ERISA would undermine Congress's goal of
uniform regulation.' 85 The Court. thus barred the plaintiff's common
law suit 186
Conversely, in 1987, in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, the
United States Supreme Court, by a five-to-four majority, held that
ERISA did not preempt a Maine statute requiring employers to provide
a one-time severance payment to employees in the event of a plant
closing.' 87 The Court determined that the purpose of the preemption
clause was to prevent fragmented state-by-state regulation of employee
benefit plans in favor of a uniform system of federal regulation.' 88
Because the statute did not establish any substantive requirements that
would affect plan administration in such a way as to undermine Con-
gress's goal of uniform regulation, the Court concluded that the statute
did not "relate to" ERISA plans for the purposes of preemption.' 89
Reasoning that a one-time, lump-sum payment that the employer may
never have to make required no particular administrative scheme to
comply with the statute, the Court held that ERISA did not preempt
the statute. 1"
The dissenting opinion attacked the majority's reliance on the fact
that the statute did not burden plan administration.''" The dissent
argued that any state law requiring employers to pay benefits to em-
ployees necessarily "relates to" ERISA plans)612 The dissent further
maintained that the statute actually created a benefit plan within the
meaning of ERISA because it established a mechanism by which em-
ployers had to pay benefits to employees.'" Reasoning that the major-
' 84 Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52 &
185 Id at 56.
18" Id. at 57.
187 482 U.S. 1, 5, 23 (1987). The statute at issue provided that "[a]ny employer who relocates
or terminates a covered establishment shall be liable to his employees for severance pay at the
rate of one week's pay for each year of employment by the employee in that establishment." Id.
at 4 ti.2 (quoting ME. Rim STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (West Supp. 1986-1987)).
188 1d. at 11.
189 id. at 12, 23.
19') Id. at 12.
191 1d. at 23 (White, J., dissenting).
192 Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 24 (While,.]., dissenting) (eking Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97).
193 See id. (White, J., dissenting).
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ity's administrative scheme rationale would be inconsistent with Con-
gress's intent, as clearly articulated in section 514(a), to preempt all
state laws that relate to ERISA plans, the dissent argued that ERISA
should preempt the statute. 1 • 4
In 1988, in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Services, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court upheld Georgia's general garnish-
ment statute against a preemption challenge while holding ERISA to
preempt another Georgia statute barring garnishment of funds due to
participants in ERISA plans.' 95 Although the operation of the statute
would lead to burdens on plan administration costs in that the statute
would force the plan to act as garnishee of its participants' benefits,
the Court, in a five-to-four portion of the opinion, reasoned that such
burdens were not sufficiently related to plans to trigger preemption.' 96
The Court pointed to other provisions in ERISA allowing for actions
against employee benefit plans that would affect administrative costs
as indicative of Congress's intent not to preclude state law judgments
against ERISA plans.'`'? For example, ERISA section 502, the civil rem-
edy provision, expressly allows for civil enforcement actions against
ERISA plans.' 98 Moreover, section 502(d) ( l) provides for the enforce-
ment of money judgments against ERISA plans. 199 The Court thus
concluded that Congress (lid not intend to preempt such common-
place "run-of-the-mill state-law claims" against employee benefit plans
for actions such as unpaid rent, debts or torts committed by the plan. 29')
Concluding that Georgia's general garnishment was a permissible
mechanism of recovery from ERISA plans, the Court held that ERISA
did not preempt the statute. 20 '
The dissenting opinion in Mackey argued that Georgia's general
garnishment statute should have been preempted. 202 The dissent em-
phasized that garnishment statutes require plans to act as garnishees,
a responsibility which significantly burdens plan administration and
cost.293 A plan acting as garnishee would have to determine each debtor
participant's entitlement, determine how much each participant owed
1.94 Id. at 26 (White, J., dissenting).
195 486 U.S. 825, 830, 841 (1988). See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Court's preemption of the anti-garnishment statute.
198 1d. at 831, 841.
197 Id. at 831-32.
198 Id. at 832. See supra note 1'26-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 502.
I" Id. at 832-33 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d) ( 1 )).
20° Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833.
201 1d. at 841.
202 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at 842 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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garnishing creditors, and make payments to a state court.'" Therefore,
the dissent argued that a state law having such a direct impact. on plan
administration necessarily "relates to" the plan and therefore should
be preempted. 205
In 1990, in Ingersoll-Rand Co. u McClendon, the United States
Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted a state common law claim
for wrongful discharge.206 In Ingersoll-Rand, the Company fired an
employee as part of a company-wide reduction in force, four months
before his pension benefits would have vested. 207
 The Court reasoned
that the plaintiff's subsequent common law action for wrongful dis-
charge "related to" the plan simply because the action was premised
on the existence of such a plan." Had the employee not subscribed
to an employee benefit plan, the Court. reasoned, he simply would not
have had a claini. 2"" The Court also looked to Congress's intent in
enacting the preemption clause and concluded that Congress desired:
[t]o ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject
to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize
the administrative and financial burden of complying with
conflicting directives among States or between States and the
Federal Government. [The development by states of differing
standards governing the same employer conduct] is funda-
mentally at odds with the goal of uniformity that Congress
sought to implement."'"
The Court reasoned that allowing the plaintiff to proceed with his
common law claims would be contrary to Congress's goal of uni-
formity because state courts are apt to reach differing common law
standards applying to the same employer conduct and consequently
might subject employee benefit plans to conflicting legal stand-
ards.'" The Court noted that the plaintiff's state law claim
conflicted directly with a cause of action provided in ERISA section
510, which prohibits interference with a participant's attainment of
benefits."'" Concluding that ERISA provided the exclusive remedy
2°4 Id. (Kennedy,., dissenting).
2°3 Mackey, 456 U.S. at 841 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
'2°6 495 U.S. 133, 140 (1990).
2° 7 /d. at 135-36.
2°8 1d. at 140.
2°9 See id.
21 ° Id. at 142.
211
	 498 U.S. at 142.
212 /d. at 142-43 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1140).
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for such a claim, the Court barred the plaintiff from bringing his
state common law suit. 213
In sum, the Supreme Court has consistently focused on the phrase
"relate to" as the key to determining the extent of the preemption
clause's reach. 214 Because of section 5 I 4(a)'s explicit language, the
Court has interpreted the scope of ERISA preemption extremely
broadly. 215 The Court uniformly has held that ERISA preempts any state
law that explicitly refers to ERISA plans. 21 " Furthermore, the Court has
held that ERISA preempts most state laws having a connection with
ERISA plans. 2 ' 7 Although recognizing that there are some state laws
whose relation to ERISA plans is "too tenuous, remote or peripheral"
to trigger preemption, the Court generally has held most state laws
preempted if they in any way affect the administration or expense of
an employee benefit plan.218 In practice, the Court has only upheld two
state laws against ERISA preemption challenges. 219 Against this back-
ground of case law interpreting ERISA's preemptive reach, federal
district courts have split over whether ERISA preempts vicarious liabil-
ity malpractice claims against managed care providers."°
III. THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF ERISA PREEMPTION
District courts holding that ERISA preempts vicarious liability
claims against managed care providers uniformly emphasize the broad
preemptive sweep of section 514(a). 221 Such courts rely heavily on
the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of section 514(a)'s Ian-
213 Id. at 140, 144. The Court thus concluded that the plaintiff should have brought an action
in federal court as specified in section 502(a). Id. at 145.
214 Id. at 138; Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981).
215 District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. lid. of " Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580, 583 (1992) (IA) law
'relates to' a covered employee benefit plan fur the purposes of § 514(a) if it has a connection
with or reference to such a plan.'" (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97)).
216 See, e.g., id.; FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 59 (1990); Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988).
'417 See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux. 481 U.S. 41, 43, 57 (1987); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97;
Alessi, 451 U.S. at 507.
218 See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142; Alessi, 451 U.S. at 524.
219 See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 830; Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. I, 23 (1987).
22° Compare Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical Sera:, 868 F. Stapp. 110, 114 (D. Md. 1994)
(holding that ERISA preempts vicarious liability malpractice claims against managed care organi-
zations) with Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 E Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that
ERISA does not preempt vicarious liability malpractice claims against managed care organiza-
tions).
221 See, e.g., Pomeroy, 868 F. Stipp. at I l 1; Visconti v. United States Health Care, 857 F. Supp.
1097, 1101 (E.D. Pa. 1994), reu'd sub nom. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 37 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.
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guage, stressing that Congress intended ERISA to preempt any state
law that "has a connection with or reference to such a plan." 222
 Strictly
interpreting the statutory language and the Supreme Court's sub-
sequent explanation of that language, these courts reason that vicari-
ous liability claims necessarily "relate to" ERISA plans because such
claims are derived primarily from medical care provided through a
plan. 223
 These courts argue that if large benefit plans were subject to
liability suits based on individual state common law standards, they
would lose the protection of the uniform federal regulation intended
by Congress. 224
Addressing the issue of direct liability rather than vicarious liabil-
ity, in 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
in Coran-an v. United Healthcare, Inc., issued a decision that influenced
lower courts subsequently holding for preemption of vicarious liability
malpractice claims. 225
 Corcoran reinforced a broad application of the
preemption clause by holding that ERISA preempted direct liability
claims.226 In Corcoran, FlOrence Corcoran's physician, detecting the
possibility of complications, recommended that she spend the final
weeks of her pregnancy in the hospital so that a machine could moni-
tor her fetus twenty-four hours each day. 227 The defendant health plan
determined that a hospital stay was not necessary, however, and refused
to pay for it, authorizing only ten hours per day of home nursing
care.228
 Two weeks later, during a period in which the nurse was not
on duty, Ms. Corcoran's fetus went into distress and died. 229 Ms. Cor-
coran subsequently brought a direct negligence suit against United
Healthcare for its refusal to pay for hospitalization. 23nThe United States
District Court for the District of Louisiana granted a motion for sum-
mary judgment in favor of United Healthcare, holding that ERISA
1995) (holding vicarious liability claims should not be subject to removal to federal courts); Ricci
v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 31.7 (D.N,I. 1993).
222
 See, e,g., Nealy v. United States Healthcare 1 -IMO, 844 F. Supp. 966, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987)). For a discussion of Pilot Life, see
supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
223
 See. e.g., Butler v. Wu, 853 K Supp. 125, 129 (D.N1j. 1994).
221 Nealy, 844 F. Supp. at 970-71 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142
(1990)), For a discussion of Ingemil-Rand, see sn/em notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
225 See Corcoran v. United States, 965 F.2d 1321, 1334, 1339 (5th Cir,), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
812 (1992).
2211 see id.
227 M. at 1324.
228 Id
225 Id.
23" Casroran, 965 F.2d at 1324.
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preempted the Corcoran's claims:23 i On appeal, the Fifth Circuit ob-
served that Congress enacted in ERISA "a preemption clause so broad
and a statute so comprehensive that it would be incompatible with the
language, structure and purpose of the statute to allow tort suits against
entities so integrally connected to a plan.'"'' The court thus held that
ERISA preempted Ms. Corcoran's suit because her malpractice claim
necessarily implicated plan administration. 2" This broad prohibition
of tort suits against plan-related entities, such as managed care provid-
ers, has influenced several courts' determinations of vicarious liabil-
ity sui ts. 234
For example, other courts holding in favor of preemption empha-
size that the majority rule is that ERISA preempts direct liability claims
against managed care organizations.235 These courts reason that to
preempt direct liability claims while not preempting vicarious liability
claims would result in the anomalous situation in which a managed
care organization's liability would be inversely proportional to the level
of its involvement in providing care. 236
 To illustrate this point, consider
the following comparison. In the 1994 case of Butler v. Wu, the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that ERISA
precluded a deceased patient's estate from bringing a vicarious liability
malpractice claim against a managed care organization for the negli-
gence of one of its affiliated physicians. 237
 The managed care organi-
zation's involvement was limited to putting the patient in contact with
the negligent physician. 2  Conversely, in Corcoran, discussed supra, the
managed care organization's express denial of coverage of the plain-
tiff's hospitalization led directly to the death of her fetus.'" Logic
seemingly would dictate that based on level of involvement and conse-
quent responsibility, if the Corcoran HMO was not subject to liability,
231 Id. at 1325.
232 Id. at 1334.
233 See id. at 1332, 1339.
234 See, e.g., Visconti, 857 F. Supp at 1101; Butler, 853 F. Supp. at 129; Ricci, 840 F. Stipp. at
317.
235 See, e.g., Visconti, 857 F. Stipp. at 110. Indeed, several district courts holding that ERISA
does not preempt vicarious liability claims against managed care organizations have done so in
spite of their recognition that ERISA preempts direct liability' claims arising from plan admini-
stration or challenging the level of benefits received under the plan. See, e.g., Jackson v. Roseman,
878 F. Supp. 820, 825 (D. Md. 1995) (citing Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1332); Haas v. Group Health
Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544, 547-48 (S.D. Ill. 1994),
239 See Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 1103; Ricci v. Guoherman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (D.N.J.
1993).
237 853 F. Supp. at 129.
238 See id. at 127.
239 See Corcoran., 965 F.2d at 1324.
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then the Butler HMO certainly should not be."" If the Butler court had
held that ERISA did not preempt vicarious liability claims, however,
the reverse would be true."' Courts ruling in favor of preemption
reason that Congress could not have intended such an incongruous
result."2
Several courts have holstered their holdings by reasoning that the
distinction between direct liability claims assailing plan administration
and vicarious liability malpractice claims is, in practice, artificia1. 2 ' 13
Courts reason, for instance, that when managed care organizations
provide medical care to participants, the organizations are actually
administering benefits."' These courts reason that the benefit is the
medical care.245
 Thus, the courts reason, malpractice claims challeng-
ing the quality of medical care are actually challenging "a constructive
denial of [the quality of] benefits" promised. 248
 In 1994, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania employed
this reasoning, in Dukes v. United Slates Health Care Systems of Pennsyl-
vania, Inc. [hereinafter Dukes 11, and held that ERISA preempted a
plaintiff's vicarious liability claim against a managed care organiza-
tion. 2`47
 Cecilia Dukes brought suit against U.S. Health Care after an
affiliated facility refused to give her husband a blood test ordered by
another physician affiliated with the organization.ns Ms. Dukes's hus-
band died three clays later of a condition that could have been easily
diagnosed and treated through a timely blood test. 249 The court rea-
soned that although the plaintiff pled her claim as a vicarious liability
malpractice action, in actuality, her claim amounted to a complaint
that the benefits that her husband had received did not live up to the
benefits that U.S. Health Care had contracted to provide. 250
 The court
24° See Visconti, 857 E Stipp. at 1103; Ricci, 840 F. Stipp. at 317-18. For a discussion of Visconti,
see infra notes 252-57 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Ricci, see .supra notes 15-28
and accompanying text.
241 Nee Visconti, 857 E Supp. at 1103; Ricci, 840 E Supp. at 317-18.
242 Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 1103; Ricci, 840 E Supp. at 317-18.
2 ' 15 See Pomeroy v. johns Hopkins Medical Serv., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 110,113-14 (1). Md. 1994);
Dukes v. United States Health Care Syst. of Penn., inc., 848 F. Supp, 39,42 (E.D. Pa. 1994),
37 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding vicarious liability malpractice claims improperly removed to
federal court., remanded in state court),
244 Chittenden, sUpin note 80, at 480.
245 Id.
296 Id.
247
 848 F. Supp. at 43.
24H Id, at 40.
249
 Dukes v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 57 F,3d 350,352 (3d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Dukes
//J.
252
 Dukes 1, 848 F Supp. at 42.
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held that such a claim, calling into question the determination of
benefits, necessarily related to the administrative duties of an ERISA
plan and was therefore preempted. 25 '
In 1994, in Visconti v. United States Health Care, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that ERISA
preempted all malpractice claims against managed care organizations
because an ERISA plan was the source of the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant HM0. 252 During the third trimester of her
pregnancy, Linda Visconti's vital signs and fetal weight became abnor-
mal and her baby daughter was subsequently stillborn. 2" In a vicarious
liability suit against U.S. Health Care, Ms. Visconti contended that her
physician ignored her condition, allowed it to deteriorate drastically
and caused her baby to be stillborn. 254 The district court reasoned that
if the plaintiff had not had medical insurance as part of an employee
benefit plan, the plaintiff would not have visited the negligent physi-
cian. 255 In other words, absent the employee benefit plan, the plaintiff
Ms. Visconti would have had no claim. 256 Accordingly, the district court
concluded that because the plan served as the source of the affiliation
between a plan participant and a managed care provider, it furnished
enough of a connection or relationship to meet the United States
Supreme Court's low standard for triggering preemption. 257
Courts holding that ERISA preempts vicarious liability claims
against managed care organizations also reason that because courts
deciding vicarious liability claims would have to inquire into the terms
of employee benefit plans, such claims necessarily "relate to" ERISA
plans.258 In order to prove that an allegedly negligent physician was an
"ostensible agent" of the managed care organization, for example, a
plaintiff' would have to prove both that he or she reasonably looked to
the institution rather than the individual physician for care and that
the organization held out the physician as its employee. 259 In Visconti,
the court observed that deciding whether the plaintiff had proven the
presence of an ostensible agency relationship would require the court
to inquire into what representations the managed care provider had
251 See id.; Chittenden, supra note 80, at 489.
252 857 F. Stipp. at 1101, 1105.
253
 Id, at 1099.
251 Id.
255 Id. at 1101.
256 id.
257 Visconti, 857 F. Stipp. at 1101, 1104.
25 t1 See, e.g., Pomeroy, 868 F. Stipp. at 114; Visconti, 857 F. Stipp. at 1102.
251/ Se e supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text for an explanation of the "ostensible
agency" doctrine.
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made to the participant. 26" Such an inquiry might require inspection
of brochures, the directories of participating physicians and the terms
of the relevant contracts between the provider, physician and partici-
pant, all of which relate to the plan. 261
 After establishing the presence
of "ostensible agency," a court would have to determine whether the
benefits actually received measured up to the benefits to which the
participant was entitled. 262
 This balancing, the court reasoned, would
require an active inquiry into the benefits of the plan, an activity
necessarily related to the plan.263
 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania
consequently concluded that reference to employee benefit plans in
the course of deciding vicarious liability claims against managed care
organizations provides a relationship significant enough to trigger
preemption. 264
Courts holding in favor of ERISA preemption fltrther reason that
allowing liability suits against benefit plans would adversely affect such
plans by increasing their costs. 26' In 1993, the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, in Ricci v. Gooberrnan, concluded
that the expense associated with defending against liability suits and
carrying malpractice insurance would increase the cost of running
managed care organizations.'" The court reasoned that the managed
care organization would assuredly pass any resultant increase on to the
employee benefit plan, thereby depleting plan assets. 2"7
 Plan partici-
pants, the court reasoned, would ultimately bear the brunt of this chain
reaction in the form of lower wages and reduced benefits. 21" The court
explained that because vicarious liability claims would result in in-
creased costs to the plan and plan participants, they necessarily "relate
to" the plans and plan administration. 26' The court therefore con-
cluded that ERISA must preempt such claims. 270
In sum, emphasizing the United States Supreme Court's broad
interpretation of section 5:14(a)'s preemptive reach, district courts
2°857 F. Supp. at 1102; see also Dukes I, 848 F. Supp. at 42.
261 Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 1102.
262 Id. at 1103.
263
 Id. at 1102; see also Dukes 1, 848 F. Supp. at 42; Nealy v. United States Healthcare HMO,
844 F. Supp. 967, 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
264
 Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 1102; see also Pomeroy, 868 F, Stipp. at 114; Buller, 853 F. Stipp. at
128, 129; Dukes I, 848 F. Sum). at 42; Nealy, 844 F. Stipp. at 972.
265 Dulles 1, 848 F. Supp. at 43; Ricci, 840 F. Stipp. at 318.
266 840 F. Supp. at 318. See also Chittenden, suirra note 80, at 489.
267 Bird, 840 F. Supp. at 318.
26N Id.; see also Dukes I, 848 F. Supp. at 43; Chinenden, supra note 80, at 489.
269
 Dukes 1, 848 F. Supp. at 43; Ricci, 840 F. Supp. at 318.
275 .iticd, 840 F. Supp. al. 318.
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which hold that ERISA preempts vicarious liability malpractice claims
against managed care organizations advance several arguments in sup-
port of preemption. 27 ' First, these courts argue that to preempt direct
liability claims while not preempting vicarious liability claims would
result in the anomalous situation in which a managed care organiza-
tion's liability would be inversely proportional to the level of its involve-
ment in providing care. 272 Second, malpractice claims challenging the
quality of care administered by the organization are better classified as
claims based "upon a constructive denial of [the quality of] benefits"
promised and thus, like direct liability claims, should be preempted.273
Third, these courts reason that ERISA should preempt all malpractice
claims against managed care organizations because ERISA plans are
the source of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant
HMO. 274 Fourth, the level of inquiry that deciding such claims would
require of courts necessitates a conclusion that such claims relate to
benefit plans. 275 Finally, courts holding in favor of ERISA preemption
reason that allowing liability suits against benefit plans would adversely
affect such plans by increasing their costs. 27"
IV. THE ARGUMENT OPPOSING ERISA PREEMPTION
Although courts holding against preemption appreciate that Con-
gress intended section 514(a) to ensure a uniform federal scheme of
regulating employee benefit plans, they also recognize that the pre-
emption clause is not without limits. 277 These district courts have
looked to the Circuit Courts of Appeals for general guidance in deter-
mining what types of state laws ERISA preempts and what types it does
not.278 Several circuit court decisions have limited ERISA's preemptive
reach to certain defined types of state laws. 279
27 See, e.g.. Pomeroy, 868 F. Stipp. at 112; Visconti, 857 F. Stipp. at 1100 ; Bird, 840 F. Supp.
at 316-17.
272 See Visconti, 857 F. Stipp. at 1097, 1103; Rieci, 840 F. Stipp. at 317-18.
275 Chittenden, supra note 80, at 489.
274 Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 1101, 1105.
275 See, e.g., Pomeroy, 868 F. Supp. at 114; Visconti, 857 F. Stipp. at 1102.
276 See, e.g., Dukes I, 848 F. Supp. at 43; Ricci, 840 F. Stipp. at 318.
277 See, e.g., Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Stipp, 820, 823-24 (1). Md. 1995) (quoting Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983) (ERISA does not preempt state law relating to ERISA
plans in 'too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner.")); Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F.
Supp. 669, 671 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (citing District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S.
Ct. 580, 583 n.1 (1992)).
27" See, e.g., Jackson, 878 F. Supp. at 825-20; Kearney v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 859 F.
Stipp. 182, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
275 Airparts Co. v. Custom Benefits Serv. of Austin, Inc., 28 F.3d 1062, 1064-65 (10th Cir.
1994); United Wire v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 095 17.2(1 1179, 1195 (3d Cir. 1993).
July 19961	 ERISA ANI) VICARIOUS LIABILITY	 843
For instance, in 1993, in United Wire v. Morristown Memorial Hos-
pital, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld
a New Jersey statutory hospital rate-setting scheme against a preemp-
tion attack.'s" The statute at issue mandated that hospitals compute
charges based on "diagnostic related groups" ("DRGs"), or on average
costs incurred by hospitals throughout the state to treat various condi-
tions rather than on treatment received by the patient:181 The plan
provided for a discount of 2.2% below the DRG rate to high volume
plans such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield and a discount of 11% below the
DRG rate to plans with open enrollment? To ensure that hospitals
would recover the income lost through these discounts, the statute
allowed hospitals to bill patients not belonging to plans receiving the
discount at a rate higher than the DRG rate. 283 A group consisting of
several self-insured employee benefit plans and individual plan partici-
pants brought suit seeking an injunction against application of the
statutory scheme to them as well as restitution of moneys paid under
the terms of the statute?'
The Third Circuit determined that a state law "relates to an ERISA
plan if it is specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans, if it
singles out such plans for special treatment, or if the rights or restric-
tions it creates are predicated on the existence of such a plan."28' The
court reasoned that a state law that does not directly relate to ERISA
plans nevertheless may be subject to preemption if its effect is "to
dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA plans with regard to their
benefits, structure, reporting and administration, or if allowing states
to have such rules would impair the ability of a plan to function
simultaneously in a number of states."'s" The court characterized the
New Jersey statute as a law of "general applicability" that was not
designed to affect ERISA plans and did not single out such plans for
28° United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1189, 1195.
281 Id. at 1189. The statute at issue, the New Jersey Health Care Facilities Planning Act of
1971, as amended by the Health Care Cost Reduction Act of 1978, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:211-1 and
its regulations, N.J. Admin. § 8:31 B, is very similar in structure and effect to the New York statute
upheld by the Supreme Court in New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1674 (1995), discussed infra notes 351-54 and accompanying
text.
252 United Wire, 995 F.2d at 11911. The purpose of the variable charge rate was to compensate
those insurers willing to insure high-risk subscribers whom traditional commercial insurers would
be reluctant to enroll. See id. at 1189.
255 Id.
284 IrL a( 1188.
255 1d. al 1192.
'86 /(1. at 1193.
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attention. 287 Rather, the court reasoned, the statute functioned regard-
less of the existence of such plans. 288
 Thus, the court concluded that
the statute was unlike those state laws that courts have held ERISA to
preempt. 28" The court gave little weight to the fact that the New Jersey
statute resulted in increased costs for certain plans, reasoning that such
an indirect economic effect did not in any way infringe upon internal
administration or benefit structure, nor make interstate operation of
the plan more difficult. 299
 The court concluded that ERISA preempts
only those state laws that directly relate to plans and affect plan ad-
ministration or ability to operate uniformly in several states.291 There-
fore, the Third Circuit upheld the New Jersey statute because the
statute was not the type of claim that Congress intended to preempt
with section 514(a). 2"2
In 1994, in Airparts Co. v. Custom Benefits Services of Austin, Inc.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit enumerated
a similar set of limited and defined classes of state laws that are subject
to ERISA preemption. 293 In Ailarts, a corporation and the co-trustees
of an ERISA plan brought state law negligence, fraud and implied
indemnity claims against an actuarial firm that the plaintiff corpora-
tion had employed as a consultant:494
 The defendant actuarial firm
asserted that ERISA preempted all state law claims brought by the
plaintiff corporation and plan. 295 The court recognized that the
preemptive sweep of ERISA, though broad, is not unlimited, 296
 and,
relying on its 1992 decision in National Elevators Industries v. Calhoun,
explicitly enumerated four categories of claims having a sufficient
nexus to ERISA plans so as to trigger preemption:
First, laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of ERISA
plans. Second, laws that create reporting, disclosure, funding,
or vesting requirements for ERISA plans. Third, laws that
provide rules for the calculation of the amount of benefits to
287 United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192.
288
289 See id.
290 Id. at 1193.
291 Id.
292 United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1195.
293
 28 E3d 1062, 1064-65 (10th Cir. 1994),
294 Id. at 1064.
295 See id.
296 Id. at 1065 ("What triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on ;idminis-
native procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit plans,
such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit.").
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be paid under ERISA plans. Fourth, laws and common-law
rules that provide remedies for misconduct growing out of
the administration of the ERISA
The Airports court then added to this list those laws that affect
relations among the principal ERISA entities—the employer, the
plan, the plan fiduciaries and the beneficiaries."' Conversely, the
court reasoned, ERISA tends not to preempt laws of general appli-
cability involving traditional areas of state regulation whose effect
on ER1SA plans is fortuitous."' According to the court, the state law
claims at issue, although likely resulting in increased plan costs due
to litigation, were claims of general applicability and did not fall
into any of the categories that it found ERISA usually to preempt."
Thus, as did the Third Circuit in United Wire, the Tenth Circuit held
that state law claims having only a tangential effect on ERISA plans,
such as increased plan costs clue to litigation, do not rise to the level
of relatedness required to trigger ER1SA preemption. 301
Courts holding against preemption of vicarious liability malprac-
tice claims against managed care providers reason that such claims are
unlike the types of claims that the circuit courts have held ERISA to
preempt. 402 For example, in -1990, in Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
concluded that a malpractice victim's vicarious liability claim against
her HMO for the malpractice of a physician affiliated with the organi-
zation had nothing to do with a denial of benefits under a plan."
Rather, the court concluded, such a victim simply seeks redress for
physical injuries stemming from a physician's malpractice."' The dis-
trict court therefore held that ERISA did not preempt the claim be-
cause it was unlike the types of state law that Congress intended ERISA
to preempt."
297 Id. 1064-65 (quoting National Elevator Indus. v. Calhoun, 957 F.2d 1555, 1558-59 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.. 406 (1992)).
208 Airparts, 28 E3d at 1065.
299
'"" Id. at [066.
" Id.; see also United Wire, 995 E2d at 1193.
302 See, e.g., Pacilicare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.5(1 151, 154 (10th Cir. 1995); Jackson v.
Roseman, 878 F. Stipp. 820, 825-26 (D. Md. 1995); Kearney v. United Stales Healthcare, Inc., 859
F. Stipp. 182, 186 (F.D. Pa. 1994).
303 733 F. Supp. 983, 988 (ED. Pa. 1990).
3tM Id.
.ioti
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Similarly, in 1994, in Kearney v. United States Healthcare, Inc., the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
differentiated between the characters of vicarious and direct liability
claims when it allowed a malpractice claim to proceed under a theory
of vicarious liability. 306 In Kearney, the plaintiff alleged that a physician
affiliated with U.S. Healthcare had misdiagnosed her husband, result-
ing in his death.;'" The district court held that ERISA preempted the
plaintiff's direct liability claims against U.S. Healthcare, which were
premised on common law theories of misrepresentation, negligence
and breach of contract, because those claims challenged the admini-
stration of the plan and the level of benefits that the plan provided.'"'"
By contrast, her vicarious liability claims against the HMO, the court
reasoned, did not challenge plan administration of the level of benefits
provided. 31"' The court further distinguished between direct and vicari-
ous liability claims by reasoning that, whereas direct liability claims
are premised on the existence of an ERISA, plan and therefore have
a significant connection with such plans, vicarious liability claims op-
erate without regard to ERISA plans and indeed may be directed at
any managed care organization irrespective of whether it is affiliated
with an ERISA plan. 31 " Therefore, the court held that ERISA did not
preempt the plaintiff's vicarious liability malpractice claims against
the HM0. 3 "
Courts holding against preemption of vicarious liability malprac-
tice claims directly refute the notion that such claims amount to actions
to collect benefits that ultimately challenge plan administration. 312 In
1994, in Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois noted that vicarious liability
claims, unlike direct liability claims, are not alternative actions to
collect benefits. 313
 Rather, the court reasoned, such claims merely pro-
vide a means by which a beneficiary may recover for injuries stemming
from medical malpractice by a managed care provider that may or
may not be affiliated with an ERISA plan.314
 The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois reached a similar conclusion
31 "' See Kearney, 859 F, Stipp, at 186, 187,
307 Id. at 184.
Son hi. at 185, 186.
grra Id. at 187.
310 Id.
311 Kearney, 859 F. Stipp. at 188.
312 FlailS v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Stipp. 544, 548 (S.D. 111. 1994); Smith v. HMO
Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669, 671-72 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
313 Haas, 875 F. Stapp. at 548. For a discussion of Haas, see supra notes 2-14 and accompa-
nying text.
314
 See id.
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in Smith v. HMO Great Lakes. ' 1 ' In Smith, Charles and Peggy Smith
brought suit individually and as parents of their daughter, Ginny
Smith, alleging that several physicians affiliated with the defendant
HMO had failed to properly deliver and care for their daughter."' Mr.
and Mrs. Smith claimed that their daughter Ginny suffered from severe
disabilities stemming from Fetal distress during her birth. 317
 The court
reasoned that the Smiths' claims against the defendant HMO were
based not on plan benefits, but rather on the principles of professional
malpractice and contractual relationship."' Consequently, the court
reasoned, the claims were not the functional equivalent of claims for
benefit and thus did not trigger ERISA preemption.' 1 J
Courts holding against preemption tend to characterize vicarious
liability claims as laws of "general applicability" that do not "single out
ERISA plans for special treatment" and function regardless of the
existence of such plans."" Because vicarious liability is a valid theory
of liability in most states, these courts reason, malpractice claims based
on that theory would not drastically affect the ability of a plan to
operate simultaneously in different states."' Further, as professional
Malpractice claims are an area traditionally covered by state law, courts
argue that they should be reluctant to conclude that Congress in-
tended to preempt such claims, absent clear indicia of such intent.322
In sum, these courts maintain that ERISA should not preempt vicarious
liability malpractice claims because such claims fall under the rubric
of "run-of-the-mill state-law claims" that Congress did not intend to
preempt.'"
In 1994, in Kearney v. United States Healthcare, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected
the notion that allowing recovery based on a theory of vicarious liabil-
ity while not allowing recovery based on a theory of direct liability
would create an anomalous situation. 324
 The court explained that vi-
515 852 F. Supp. at 671-72.
516 Id. at 670.
317 Id.
514 Id. at 671-72.
319 Id. at 672.
52°
 Haas, 875 E Stipp. at 548; see also United Wire v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F',2d
1179, 1192 (3d Cir. 1993). For a discussion of United Wire, see supra notes 280-92 and accompa-
nying text.
" I See, e.g., United VVile, 995 F.2d at 1193; Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 E Stipp. 983,
988 (E. Pa. 1990).
522 Haas, 875 F. Supp. at 549; Smith, 852 E Stipp. at 672.
525 See Independence HMO, 733 F. Stipp. at 989 (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency
& Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988)). For a discussion of Markey, see suf.ra macs 164-67 and
195-201 and accompanying text.
324 859 F. Supp. 182, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1994). For a discussion of Kearns see supra notes 306-11
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carious liability malpractice claims may target any managed care or-
ganization, regardless of whether the plaintiff secured his or her cov-
erage through an employee benefit plan. 325 The court concluded that
it would be more anomalous to allow plaintiffs with privately secured
health coverage to proceed in suits while not allowing recovery for
plaintiffs who have secured coverage through their employers. 326 In this
court's view, to allow such a distinction based solely on whether the
managed care organization is affiliated with an employee benefit plan
would allow ERISA plans to operate in a fully insulated legal world. 327
Consequently, the court reasoned, ERISA should not preempt the
plaintiff's vicarious liability malpractice claims."'
In 1995, in Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reasoned that contrary
to the argument put forth by district courts holding in favor of pre-
emption, vicarious liability claims do not really require a court to
inquire heavily into an ERISA plan. 329 In Pacificare of Oklahoma, an
HMO sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth Circuit ordering a
district judge to rescind his order remanding to state court two vicari-
ous liability claims against the HMO."° The Tenth Circuit observed
that courts deciding vicarious liability claims rely solely on common
law concepts of agency and tort to determine the two issues relevant
to such claims: whether the treating physician's conduct was negligent
and whether an agency relationship existed between the physician and
the managed care organization."' Malpractice claims do not assert that
the plaintiff was denied benefits; rather, they assert merely that the
plaintiff received the benefit from a provider who performed negli-
gently.'" The court further reasoned that a court can determine
whether a physician performed negligently without referring to the
and accompanying text. For a discussion of district courts that have held for preemption in part
because of the anomalous situation that would result from allowing recovery based on vicarious
liability but not based on direct liability, see supra notes 235-42 and accompanying text.
325 See id. at 187.
326 Id. at 187 n.7.
327 Id. at 187 (citing United Wire v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2(1 1179, 1193 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
328 a at 188.
329 See Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burger, 59 F.3d 151, 154 (10th CM 1995). For a
discussion of courts holding ERISA to preempt vicarious liabilty malpractice claims because of
the level of inquiry into employee benefit plans that such a determination would require of the
deciding court, see supra notes 258-64 and accompanying text.
"" Id. at 152.
331 See id. at 154.
932 Id. See also Kearney, in which the court noted that if a physician were to sue a plan for
services rendered, the physician would necessarily make reference to the plan in order to prove
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plan."" Denying the petition for a writ of mandamus, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that such a determination demands only that the court look
into what transpired between the physician and the plaintiff, and
whether in providing the covered medical care, the physician acted
with the knowledge and skill required by professional and societal
standards of concluct." 4
The Tenth Circuit also refuted the argument that ERISA should
preempt vicarious liability claims because such claims would affect the
costs of ERISA plans."5
 Relying on the Tenth Circuit's 1994 decision
in Airparts Co. v. Custom Benefits Services of Austin, Inc., the court
reasoned that so long as "a state law does not affect the structure, the
administration, or the type of benefits provided by an ERISA plan, the
mere fact that the [law] has some economic impact on the plan does
not require that the [law] be invalidated."'" The Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that the fact "that a plan is potentially liable for a judgment 'is
not enough to relate the action to the plan.'"a37
 Thus, a mere indirect
economic effect on an employee benefit plan does not provide a
sufficient relationship between the state law and a plan to trigger
preemption.'"
In 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed and remanded to state court two of the leading cases in
support of the position that ERISA preempts vicarious liability claims.""
In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, ("Dukes II'), the Third Circuit consolidated
Visconti v. U.S. Health Care and Dukes 1 on appeal and reversed both
on the grounds that they had been improperly removed to federal
court."" The court in Dukes II reasoned that state law causes of action
the specifics of the relationship between the physician and the plan. 859 F. Stipp. at 186-87.
Concluding that an inquiry into the relationship between the physician and the plan in such a
setting certainly would nut trigger preemption, the court found that there was no reason to
preempt a vicarious liability malpractice claim because it involves the same level or inquiry. hi. at
187. Thus, any reference to a plan to resolve the issue of whether an agency relationship existed
would implicate ERISA "in too tenuous, remote or peripheral" a manner to warrant a finding
that the law relates to the plan. See id. For a discussion of Kearney, see supra notes 306-11 and
accompanying text.
333 Pacifirare (y . Okla., 59 F.3d at 154.
:431 Id. (quoting Kearnty, 859 F. Supp. at 186).
355 ,,rd„
"6
 Id. (quoting Airparts Co. v. Custom Benefits Sera. of Austin, Inc., 28 F.3d 1062,1005 (10th
Cir. 1994)), For a discussion of Airparts, see supra notes 295-301 and accompanying text.
337 14. at 159 (quoting Aiiparts, 28 F.3d at 1065).
338
 Pacificare tf Okla., 59 F.3d at 154; 'liquids, 28 F.3d at 1065.
339 MACS v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350,561 (3d Cir. 1995).
34°
 M. at 353,3511. See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text fur a discussion of Dukes
I, 848 F. Stipp, 39 (F.D. Pa. 1994) and notes 252-57 and accompanying text for discussion of
Visconti, 857 F. Stipp. 1097 (EA/ Pa. 1994).
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that do not fall under the scope of section 502, ERISA's civil remedy
provision, are not removable and should remain in state court." Al-
though the court did not decide the specific issue of whether ERISA
should preempt such claims, its decision highlighted the differences
between vicarious liability and direct liability claims. 542 The Third Cir-
cuit directly refuted the notion that vicarious liability malpractice
claims call into question plan administration or the level of benefits
due, stating that vicarious liability plaintiffs "are not attempting to
define 'new rights under the terms of the plan': instead, they are
attempting to assert their already-existing rights under the generally-
applicable state law of tort and agency."'" Rebutting the proposition
that vicarious liability malpractice plaintiffs seek to enforce benefits
under the plan, the court instead characterized vicarious liability
claims as attacking only the quality of the benefits received.'" Noting
that "patients enjoy the right to be free from medical malpractice
regardless of whether or not their medical care is provided through
an ERISA plan," the Third Circuit held that such claims do not fall
within the scope of section 502 and therefore are not removable to
federal court."'
In sum, courts holding that ERISA does not preempt vicarious
liability claims against managed care organizations assert several argu-
ments in favor of their position."' These courts reason that such claims
are unlike any of the types of claims that courts have held ERISA to
preempt and arc not equivalent to actions to collect benefits that
ultimately challenge plan administration."' Furthermore, these courts
reason that the level of judicial inquiry into benefit plans that deciding
vicarious liability malpractice claims would require does not sufficiently
relate to ERISA plans because such claims require only that the court
look into what transpired between the physician and the plaintiff and
whether, in providing the covered medical care, the physician acted
according to professional and societal standards of conduct."" Courts
holding against preemption conclude that a mere indirect economic
effect on an employee benefit plan does not provide a sufficient rela-
" Dukes 11, 57 F.:Mat 355.
34 '2 See id. at 358.
343 Id.
344 1d.
345 Id. at 356, 338.
346 SIT, e.g., Pacifica re of Okla., 59 F.3(1 at 154; Kraniey, 859 F. Supp. at 187; Smith v. HMO
Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669, 672 (N.D. 111. 1994).
347 See, e.g., Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Stipp. 544, 548 (S.D. 111. 1994); Smith,
852 F. Supp. at 672.
348 Pacificare of Okla., 59 F.3(1 at 154.
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tionship between the state law and an ERISA plan so as to trigger
preemption.s'I 9
V. THE EFFECT OF NEW YORK CONFERENCE OF BLUE CROSS &
BLUE SHIELD PLANS V. Mit VELERS INSURANCE Co.
A. New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court raised, or at least
clarified, the threshold level of "connection" that a state law must have
to an ERISA plan in order to trigger preemption."'" In New York. Con-
ference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., a
unanimous Court held that ERISA did not preempt a New York stat-
ute that required hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered
by a commercial insurer, but not from patients insured by Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, and that subjected HMOs to surcharges varying
with the number of Medicaid recipients enrolled. 351 The New York
statute required hospitals to calculate patient charges based on the
average cost of treating someone with that patient's medical problem
rather than on the actual cost of an individual patient's treatment." 52
The statute provided that while hospitals had to bill patients covered
by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Medicaid and HMOs at the rate based
on average costs of treatment, they had to bill patients covered by
traditional fee-for-service commercial insurance plans at the average
rate plus a thirteen percent surcharge."" The statute also required
HMOs to pay a variable surcharge of up to nine percent directly to
the state. 354
349 See id.; Airparis Co. v. Custom Benefits Sem of Austin, Inc., 28 F.3d 1062, 1065 (10th Cir.
1994).
35" See New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.. 115 S.
Ct. 1671 (1995).
351 Id. at 1674, 1680. The New York rate-setting statute at issue, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW.
2807—c(1)(a), is similar in concept to the New Jersey rate-setting statute upheld by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Visited Wire v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2r1 1179, 1189-90
(3el Cir. 1993). See SUPra notes 281-84 and accompanying text.
352 Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1674. The Court noted with approval that the primary reason the
statute singled out Blue Cross/Blue Shield for preferential rate treatment was us compensate
those plans for their practice of open enrollment. Id. at 1678. Open enrollment means that those
insurers provide coverage to many subscribers whom ctsunnereial insurers would refuse to cover
as unacceptable risks. Id.
553 1d. a( 1674.
354 Id.
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The Court began its opinion by stressing that the principles of
federalism should govern its preemption analysis." 5 The Court stated
that "where a federal law is said to bar state action in fields of tradi-
tional state regulation, ... we have worked on the assumption that the
historic police powers of the state were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress.""6 Although noting the broad scope that it had given ERISA's
preemption clause in its prior decisions, the Court explained that the
scope of ERISA preemption is not limitless and does not extend to
state laws which have "only a tenuous, remote or peripheral connection
with covered plans, as is the case with many laws of general applicabil-
ity."357 Focusing on the language of section 514(a), the Court observed
that taken to their logical and literal extremes, both the "relate to" and
"connection with" phrases would extend infinitely and therefore do
little in the way of delineating which state laws do and do not "relate
to" or have a "connection with" ERISA plans. 358 The Court explained
that because resolving whether a state law has a "connection with" an
ERISA plan is no less difficult than determining whether a state law
"relates to" an ERISA plan, "connection with" is no less limiting than
"relate to" and thus does little to define the phrase."'
After thus concluding that the text of the statute does not ade-
quately or consistently define what actions do and do not "relate to"
ER1SA plans, the Court looked to the purpose of ERISA for an indica-
tion of whether Congress intended preemption to reach the New York
statute in question."' The Court reasoned that Congress intended
ERISA to establish the regulation of employee benefit plans "as exclu-
sively a federal concern," and thus create a nationally uniform system
of regulating employee benefit plans."' The preemption clause, the
Court reasoned, serves this overall purpose by avoiding multiplicitous
355 See it/. at 1676.
356 See id.
367 Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680 (citing District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade,
113 S. Ct. 580,583 11.1 (11192)). See supra notes 175-177 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade.
358 Id. at 1677. The issue may be framed another way:
[C1onsider . . . a grain of sand, for example. it requires little imagination to lind
some relationship or some connection between the sand grain and anything else
in the world. True, the relationship or connection in a given case might be strained
or farfetched, but it is some relationship or connection nonetheless .... What can
be said for a grain of sand can be said for any law.
Conison, supra note 121, at 626.
359 See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1677.
360 Id,
36i Id.
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regulation of plans that would undermine the goal of uniform regula-
tion."62
The Court next characterized the types of state laws that it had
held ERISA to preempt in the past: laws that dictated or precluded
certain methods of plan administration, frustrated plans' abilities to
operate efficiently in several states or provided alternate methods of
plan enforcement."''" The Court concluded that New York's hospital
rate-setting statute was distinct in both purpose and effect from the
types of state laws it had traditionally held ERISA to preempt.""4 The
purpose of the New York statute, the Court observed, was to compen-
sate health plans, like Blue Cross/Blue Shield, willing to insure high-
risk subscribers.""' Insuring high-risk subscribers, the Court explained,
necessarily costs more than selectively insuring only low-risk subscribers
because high-risk subscribers tend to file more claims than their low-
risk counterparts." 6" The New York statute imposed surcharges on com-
mercial insurers and HMOs unwilling to insure high-risk subscribers
in an effort to make Blue Cross/Blue Shield more price-competitive
and thus more attractive to subscribers than they otherwise would be. 3"7
These surcharges, according to the Court, neither regulated plans nor
in any way affected plan administration.'"
The Court further reasoned that the New York statute, which led
to rate differentials favoring the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, had
only an indirect economic effect on the costs of various employee
benefit plans."'"' The Court observed that the rate-setting statute had a
particularly unremarkable impact on benefit plans in light of the fact
that even absent such legislation, hospitals routinely engage in rate-set-
ting practices that impose surcharges on commercial insurers." 7° The
Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws
calling fbr rate differentials among competing plans any more than it
intended to preempt other forms of state regulation that indirectly
affected competing rates, such as quality control or workplace regula-
j62 M. at 1677-78.
36' Id. at 1678 (citing FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990); Shaw v. Delta Airlines,
463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504, 524 (1980)). See supra notes
168-74, 148-62, 140-47 and accompanying text.
" Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
ssr,
'" See hi
m 7 Id. at 1678, 1679.
544 Id. al 1679.
"Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1679.
sro
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tion.'"' The Court further noted that hospitals on their own initiative
commonly impose surcharges on patients with commercial insurance
in an effort to compensate for their financial shortfalls, resulting in
rate differentials similar to those mandated by the statute. 572 Moreover,
the Court observed, the statute's economic effects do not substantially
influence plan administration so as to alter, for example, substantive
plan coverage or to restrict a plan's choice of insurers. 575 The Court
reasoned that to interpret section 5 1 4(a) as preempting state laws
whose only impact on an ERISA plan is an indirect effect on cost would
read the limiting "relate to" language out of the statute. 374
Moreover, the Court noted that such a limitless interpretation
would "violate basic principles of statutory interpretation and could
not be squared with our prior pronouncement that jplreemption
does not occur . . . if the state law has only a tenuous, remote or
peripheral connection with covered plans, as is the case with many laws
of general applicability.'"375 The Court further reasoned that "nothing
in the language of [ERISA] or the context of its passage indicates that
Congress chose to displace general health care regulation, which his-
torically has been a matter of local concern." 37" Concluding that a state
law with an indirect economic effect does not rise to the level of the
"conflicting directives" that Congress intended to preempt, the Court
thus held that such laws do not sufficiently relate to ERISA plans as to
trigger section 514(a) preemption
B. Travelers 's Effect on the Preemption of Vicarious
Liability Malpractice Claims
The United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Travelers should
provide a boost to the movement opposing preemption of vicarious
liability claims against Managed care organizations. By upholding a
state hospital rate-setting statute against an ERISA preemption chal-
lenge, a unanimous Court implicitly raised the threshold level of con-
nection between a state law and an employee benefit plan necessary
to trigger the preemption clause. 378 Because the nature of vicarious
371 a
372 a
373 Id.
371 Travel,m, 115 S. Ct. at 1679.
375 Id. at 1679-80 (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. CI. 580,
583 n.1 (1992)	 turn quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983))).
976'
	 a( 1680.
577 Id.
978 See id.
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liability claims is similar to the New York statute upheld by the Supreme
Court in Travelers, courts should follow the Travelers reasoning to reject
preemption of such claims. 379
As with the statute upheld by the Supreme Court in Travelers, the
only tangible effect of vicarious liability claims against managed care
providers is an indirect economic effect on overall plan cost. 38° The
Supreme Court's reasoning in Travelers explicitly refutes the argument
that ERISA should preempt vicarious liability claims against managed
care organizations because allowing such suits will affect the cost of
administering employee benefit plans. 38 ' In upholding New York's hos-
pital rate-setting statute against a preemption challenge, the Supreme
Court implicitly upheld every state's authority to enact similar legisla-
tion. 382 The Court did not require that all hospital rate-setting statutes
should conform to New York's statutory scheme. Conversely, the
Court's reasoning left open the possibility that each individual state
could enact hospital rate-setting legislation widely differing in terms
and rates from similar legislation enacted in other states." 3 As a result,
benefit plans operating on a national level could face as many as fifty
different rate-setting schemes, each imposing its own surcharge. The
Court reasoned, however, that such a diversity of plan costs among
states would not contravene ERISA's goal of establishing a uniform
scheme of federal regulation of employee benefit plans."'" Rather, the
Court observed that "cost uniformity was almost certainly not an object
of preemption."38' Moreover, the Court concluded that allowing ERISA
to preempt state law simply because such law may have an indirect
economic impact on ERISA plans would be tantamount to reading
section 514(a) as being limitless in scope and thus would "violate the
basic principles of statutory interpretation."386
As with the New York hospital rate-setting statute at issue in Trav-
elers, the primary relation between vicarious liability claims against
379 See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1674,1678.
38° See id. at 1679.
381 See id.
382 See id. at 1680.
"3 For instance, in 1993, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld New jersey's hospital
rate-setting statute against a preemption challenge. United Wire v, Morristown Memorial Flosp.,
995 F.2d 1179,1195 (3d Cir. 1993). For a discussion of United Wire, see supra notes 280-92 and
accompanying text. Although the New jersey statute was similar in effect to the New York statute
upheld by the Court in Travelers, the specifics of the plan were not the same. Compare United
Wire, 995 F.2d at 1189-90 with Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1674.
384 See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680,
385 See id.
181; Id, at 1679-80.
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managed care providers and ERISA plans is an indirect effect on
costs."87 Courts that hold in favor of preemption of vicarious liability
claims focus on this indirect effect and reason that the impact such
claims have on plan costs establishes a relationship between the claims
and the plans sufficient to trigger preemption.sm Potential liability to
subscribers for the malpractice of affiliated physicians would certainly
force managed care organizations to carry liability insurance to cover
such a contingency."89 Just as various states are likely to enact differing
rate-setting legislation, state common law standards for proving the
presence of an ostensible agency relationship between a managed care
organization and an affiliated physician will likely vary. Premiums for
malpractice coverage that managed care organizations would carry to
protect against liability consequently would reflect the level of difficulty
of proving such a claim in each state—the easier it is for a plaintiff to
sustain the burden of proving the elements of the claim, the higher
the malpractice premiums are likely to be. As a result, employee benefit
plans probably would have to pay varying amounts to secure health
coverage for their subscribers depending upon the states in which they
operate. Such a result, however, would be no different from the inter-
state cost variation stemming from hospital rate-setting statutes upheld
by the Supreme Court in Travelers. 39° Following, the Supreme Court's
reasoning, such an indirect economic influence as an increase in
overall plan costs due to malpractice insurance certainly does not rise
to the level of those "'conflicting directives' from which Congress
meant to insulate ERISA
Like the statute at issue in Travelers, vicarious liability malpractice
claims neither call into question plan administration nor seek to en-
force or create rights under the plan."92 Rather, victims of medical
malpractice seek only to redress injuries arising from medical treat-
ment which fell below the standards of the medical profession.'" Thus,
387 See id. at 1679; see also Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir.
1995).
:'""bakes 1, 848 F. Stipp. 39, 43 (F.D. Pa. 1994), reu'd 37 F.3d 350 (3d Cit.-, 1995); Ricci v.
Gooberman, 840 F. Stipp. 316, 318 (D.N.J. 1993).
3" Ricci, 840 F. Stipp. at 318.
315) See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680. See supra notes 351-77 and accompanying text for a
description of the statute at issue in Travelers.
"I See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680.
"2 See id. at 1678.
See, e.g., Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Stipp. 544, 548 (S.D. III. 1994) ("A
vicarious liability medical malpractice action based solely upon substandard treatment is not an
alternative action to collect benefits... ."); see supra notes 2-14 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Haas.
July 19961	 EIUSA AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY	 857
vicarious liability malpractice claims are grounded in the generally-ap-
plicable common law concepts of tort and agency."' Moreover, vicari-
ous liability claims operate independently of ERISA plans; plaintiffs
may and do direct such claims at managed care providers regardless
of whether they are affiliated with an ERISA plan."' Consequently,
absent an express indication of congressional intent, courts should be
reluctant to find that ERISA preempts such claims which are tradition-
ally subject to state law."' As the Supreme Court reasoned in Travelers,
nothing in the language of ERISA or in its legislative history indicates
that Congress chose to displace such a matter which has traditionally
been a matter of local concern. 't7 Conversely, vicarious liability claims
are best characterized as "run-of-the-mill state-law claims" that Con-
gress did not. intend ERISA to preempt.'"
Moreover, vicarious liability malpractice claims are analogous to
state law mechanisms of regulating the quality of health care of which
the Supreme Court implicitly approved in Travelers:499 The common
law theory of vicarious liability, whether in the form of respondeat
superior or ostensible agency, seeks to compensate parties for injuries
that they have suffered as a result of the negligent or intentional
conduct of another's agent or employee.'" Often, the agent or em-
ployee will lack sufficient means to fully compensate victims for harm
suffered as a result of the agent or employee's actions.""' In the realm
of medical malpractice, the agent or employee may have neglected to
carry sufficient malpractice coverage to cover the victim's loss. 4"1
 Vicari-
•Dukes II, 57 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 1995).
"5 See Kearney v. United States Healthcare, 859 F. Supp. 182, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1994). For a
discussion of Kearney, see supra notes 324-28 and accompanying text.
A96 Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Stipp. 669, 672 (N.D. III. 1994); Elsesser v. Hospital of
Phila. College of Osteopathic Medicine, 802 E Supp. 1286, 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("ISItate law
has traditionally prescribed Ilse standards of professional liability and, in the absence of clear
indicia in the act or legislative history, we are reluctant to ascribe to Congress an intention to
intrude into this area.") (quoting Painters of Phila. Dist. Council No. 21 Welfare Fluid v. Price
Waterhouse, 879 F.2(1 1146, 1152-53 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that ERISA (lid not create implied
cause of action for professional malpractice)).
:3)7
 See Travelers, 115 S. 0. at 1680.
398
 Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 K Supp. 983, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (citing Mackey
v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1987)).
399 See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680 ("[N]othing in the language of the Act or the context of
its passage indicates that Congress chose to displace general health care regulation. . ..").
4()(' See, e.g., Dukes II, 57 E.3c1 at 357 ("Instead of claiming that the [plans .] in any way withheld
some quantum of plan benefits due, [vicarious liability malpractice plaintiffs .] ... complain about
the low quality of medical treatment. they actually received . . ."); see supra notes 340-345 and
accompanying text.
401 See supra note 28.
412 Id. Note that in Haas v. Group Health Man, Inc. the negligent provider was a nurse
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ous liability malpractice claims thus allow plaintiffs to hold health care
entities that proffer negligent providers as their agents or employees
accountable for the wrongs of those providers. 4°3 In this sense, vicarious
liability malpractice claims may act as a state common law method of
assuring the quality of medical care.'"
At least one court has looked to Travelers for guidance in deciding
a vicarious liability malpractice claim against a managed care organi-
zation. In August of 1995, the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, in Chaghervand v. CareFirst, correctly held that
ERISA should not preempt such an action. 405 In Chaghervand, Con-
stance Chaghervand, a member of the defendant HMO, CareFirst,
through her employer, claimed that CareFirst and affiliated physicians
failed to properly diagnose and treat her back condifion. 401 She
claimed that she suffered permanent neurological damage. 1 °7 The
court noted that Ms. Chaghervand's vicarious liability claim was differ-
ent from the Supreme Court's characterization of the types of state
laws that it has held ERISA to preempt.408 The court observed that her
vicarious liability claim did not implicate any of ERISA's objectives: it
did not seek benefits, allege improper administration, or attempt to
enforce the plan in any way. 409 Rather, the court concluded, her claim
was simply seeking damages stemming from treatment which fell below
professional standards.'"°Although the court recognized that vicarious
liability claims such as Ms. Chaghervand's may increase the costs of
operating benefit plans, the court relied upon the Supreme Court's
holding that such an indirect economic influence was insufficient to
trigger preemption. 4"
The Chaghervand court therefore properly relied on the Supreme
Court's reasoning from Travelers in holding that ERISA should not
practitioner. 875 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D. Ill. 1994). Absent a claim against the defendant HMO.
the plaintiff in that case could have been left with only a claim against a nurse practitioner and
a technician. See .supra note 28. The plaintiffs recovery for a permanently disabling injury could
then have been limited to the personal assets of the practitioner coupled with any malpractice
coverage that the practitioner may or may not have decided to carry. See id,
4"3 See Chiuenden, supra note 80, at 453-54.
41 "1 See Travelers ., 115 S. a at 1679.
4"5 909 F. Supp. 304, 312 (L). Md. 1995).
4151 1d. at 307.
to Id.
408 See id. at 311.
4") Id.
41 " Chaghervand, 909 F. Stipp. at 311.
411 hi_
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preempt Ms. Chaghervand's vicarious liability malpractice claim
against CareFirst. 412
 Recognizing that although vicarious liability mal-
practice claims do have an indirect economic impact on ERISA plans,
the court correctly appreciated that such claims in no way affect plan
administration or otherwise impede any of ERISA's objectives. 413 Fur-
ther, the court properly applied Travelers in reasoning that the poten-
tial for increased plan costs stemming from vicarious liability malprac-
tice claims was not sufficient to warrant preemption. 414
 In the future,
courts faced with the issue of ERISA preemption of vicarious liability
malpractice claims should look to the Chagheruand court's application
of the Travelers decision and similarly hold that ERISA should not
preempt such claims.'"
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past several years, district courts have rendered conflict-
ing opinions as to whether ERISA preempts vicarious liability malprac-
tice claims against managed care providers. The resultant uncertainty
has led to a situation in which a plaintiff bringing a malpractice suit
against a managed care organization might find that his or her recov-
ery depends upon the fortuity of living in a particular judicial district—
or indeed, appearing before a particular judge within that judicial
district who is amenable to such suits. If a malpractice victim happens
to bring suit in a court that holds ERISA to preempt vicarious liability
malpractice claims against managed care providers, that plaintiff can
only recover fully if the negligent provider carries adequate malprac-
tice insurance.'" If, however, the negligent physician carries in-
sufficient coverage, the plaintiff may not recover enough to fully com-
pensate him or her for injuries suffered at the hands of the negligent
physician or other health care provider. Whereas a plaintiff belonging
to a managed care organization who has secured his or her health
insurance independently would be able to bring a vicarious liability
suit, another plaintiff belonging to the same managed care organiza-
tion but who secured his or her insurance through an employee
412 See id. at 312.
413 See id at 311.
414 See id.
415
 CareFirst has decided nut to appeal this decision. Telephone Interview with David E.
Manoogian, attorney fOr CareFirst (Mar. 20 1996). Consequently, the case is currently on remand
in the Maryland state court system. Id
41C See supra note 28.
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benefit plan would not. With its 1995 decision in New York Conference
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance Co., the United States
Supreme Court unanimously provided lower courts with much needed
guidance that should help to resolve this indeterminacy. Courts in
the future are likely to hold more consistently that ER1SA does not
preempt vicarious liability malpractice suits against managed care or-
ganizations.
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